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ABSTRACT 
 
This thesis provides a comprehensive comparative analysis of different types of resource 
grabbing, which refers to rapidly changing patterns of resource access and control 
occcuring around the world. This comparative analysis aims to identify key features and 
areas in resource grabbing that could be addressed for the puroses of policy formulation 
and implementation. Resource grabbing involving land, water and ocean resources has 
generated new debates in academic and policy literatures. This thesis uses theoretical 
insights from political economy and political ecology to advance these debates by 
identifying various actors, motives, institutions and effects of resource grabbing. Drawing 
on an extensive review of the literature that includes a range of examples from areas of the 
Global South, the research established that resource grabbing is propelled by the interests 
of various political and economic actors in a context of weak institutions and institutional 
frameworks. A political ecology analysis reveals that resource grabbing processes have 
invariably had negative effects on grabbees, those actors who had prior access to or control 
over resources grabbed by other actors. This thesis established that natural resources are 
controlled from prior resource holders with a stated purpose of conservation and efficiency 
but with hidden purpose to actually satisfy the interests investors and the powerful in 
society. This control of resources subjects prior holders to marginalization and puts them 
at risk in sustaining themselves. In some of the cases of resource grabbing as reviewed in 
this thesis, changing resource control patterns have resulted in environmental conflicts and 
violence. The thesis proposes that states and policy makers adopt meaningful human rights 
approaches to natural resource management as a major pathway towards curbing land, 
water and ocean grabbing. The thesis proposes that a political economy analysis of actors, 
their interests and institutional context is key not only for developing an understanding 
resource grabbing as a problem but also for establishing policies aimed at protecting natural 
resources and marginalized peoples from grabbing. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Background of the Study 
 
Globally, nation-states have the authority to manage resources within their territorial 
boundaries including access, control and use of such resources. This authority has been re-
enforced by international agreements that assume that states have the capacities and means 
to manage and protect their natural resources. However, many so-called developing and 
Third World countries have limited financial and physical capacities to protect natural 
resources with ‘global’ value (Peluso, 1993).  
 
Resource allocation, control and use in most developing countries have been characterized 
by power struggles between the state and society, particularly resources owners and users 
(Tietenberg and Lewis, 2000). The result of these power struggles is what has given rise to 
the concept of “resource grabbing” in academic literature and research (Tietenberg and 
Lewis, 2000). This thesis provides a comprehensive comparative analysis of different types 
of resource grabbing by conducting a critical review of secondary data. 
 
Resource grabbing is an issue of concern that is broader than acquisitions of resources by 
foreign investors (Liversage, 2010) and without a consensus in terms of the definition 
(Borras et al., 2012). Land grabbing for instance often involves large-scale acquisition 
through buying, leasing or otherwise accessing productively used or potentially arable 
farmland by corporate investors to produce food and non-food crops, in order either to 
boost supply for domestic and/or world markets or obtain a favorable financial return on 
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an investment (Akram-Lodhi, 2012:125). Even if there were consensus on the definition of 
resource grabbing, and effects associated with it, large-scale deals in resources, 
particularly, lands, are typically shrouded in secrecy and no one really knows exactly how 
much land has been acquired (Ben White et al., 2012). 
 
 However, evidence suggests that the occurrence of resource grabbing has been very 
rampant in the Global South. For instance, between 2005 and 2009, it is estimated that 
about 20 million hectares of land have been grabbed from small-scale landowners; about 
40-80 million people displaced due to water grabbing in 2012; and loss of several billions 
of dollars within the fishery sector due to ocean grabbing. All these estimated figures were 
recorded in the Global South (von Braun and Meinzen-Dick, 2009; Kay and Franco 2012; 
Witbooi, 2015). 
 
 Over the last few years, there have been several studies in academic literatures which 
focused on different types of resource grabbing, including land (GRAIN et al., 2014, 2008; 
Hall, 2013, 2011; Boras et al., 2012), water (Franco et al., 2013; Sosa and Zwarteveen, 
2012; Kay & Franco, 2012) and the ocean (Bennett et al., 2015, Franco et al., 2014). The 
convergence of global crises in food, energy, and the environment has driven a dramatic 
re-evaluation of access to and ownership of land, water, marine and other resources needed 
to overcome these crises (Wood, 2012). Furthermore, land, water and more recently ocean 
resources are increasingly perceived as sources of resource and energy production 
(primarily biofuels), food (crops and fishes), mineral deposits, and reservoirs of 
environmental services to meet growing global industrial and consumer demands (Borras 
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et al., 2011). The enormous resource imperatives of contemporary capitalist markets 
therefore facilitate a growing interest in securing access to resources (GRAIN et al., 2014).  
 
Even though resource grabbing involving land, water and oceans has gained wider currency 
in recent times, what defines land, water and ocean grabbing is still contested in the 
literature. While some literature defines resource grabbing as the acquisition of natural 
resources, such as land, by actors dominated by foreigners (e.g., Rulli et al., 2013), there 
are others (see Liversage, 2010) who argue that such acquisitions involve both local and 
foreign investors. The issues of actors, their motives, institutions and institutional 
frameworks of resources acquisitions have also become a subject of contest in the 
definition of resource grabbing (Gomez, 2011; Boras et al., 2012). This has created 
challenges of fighting resource grabbing in terms of policy formulation and 
implementation.  
 
Apart from the debates involving the definition of resource grabbing, actors and their 
interests, there are different views about the implications of resource grabbing from the 
perspectives of researchers and environmentalists involving effects of resources grabbing 
(GRAIN et al., 2014; Oya, 2013). For instance, while those who argue in favor of resource 
grabbing are of the view that grabbing provides the means to bring investments and 
efficiency in the use of natural resources, opponents share different views. Opponents 
believe that resource grabbing has negative implications on those whose resources are 
taken and therefore call for effective policy measures to deal with resource grabbing 
(GRAIN et al., 2014, Hall, 2013). There are even those who believe that in general, there 
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is still insufficient information on the impacts of resource grabbing, particularly with 
reference to land grabbing (Liversage, 2010; Oya, 2013).  
 
Most studies have examined dimensions of resource grabbing such as the definition, actors 
involved and their interests, interactions of institutional frameworks and effects of resource 
grabbing. However, there are similarities that exist in these resource grabbing debates and 
this thesis will examine these similarities as well as differences.  The concept of different 
types of resource grabbing has been compared and discussed using political economy 
analysis, which emphasize actors, motives (interests), institutions and effects on prior 
resource users and on the resources. This approach is aimed at identifying the interplay of 
actors, their interests and institutional frameworks and associated effects on small-scale 
resources holders and natural resources.  
 
1.2 Research Objectives 
 
The main objective of the thesis is to complete a comparative analysis of the various forms 
of resources grabbing. This was achieved through a critical review of literature from 
secondary sources. The specific objectives include: 
 To explain the concept of resource grabbing within the context of: 
 Land grabbing; 
 Water grabbing; and 
 Ocean grabbing. 
 To compare land, water and ocean grabbing using political economy and political 
ecology analysis; and 
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  To identify effects of different forms of resource grabbing in the Global South with 
a view to proposing a common approach towards curbing land, water and grabbing.  
 
1.3 Scope and Justification of the Research 
 
The Global South has been chosen for the research due to the rampant occurrence of 
resource grabbing where such resources are perceived to be ‘unused’ and ‘underutilized’ 
(Franco et al, 2013; Levisage, 2010) coupled with the availability of cheap labor.  Available 
figures in the literature reveal that land, water and ocean grabbing have been occurring 
more rapidly and on a larger scale in the Global South. For instance, between 2005 and 
2009, about 20 million hectares of land have been taken from small-scale landowners; 40-
80 million displaced due to water grabbing in 2012; and loss of several billions of dollars 
within the fishery sector due to ocean grabbing in the Global South (Kay and Franco 2012; 
von Braun and Meinzen-Dick, 2009; Witbooi, 2015). These figures are potentially higher 
than reported and have been projected to increase in the coming years if not checked 
(Liversage, 2010). 
 
The thesis contributes to unraveling the debates that surround land, water and ocean 
grabbing in the areas of what constitutes resource grabbing, actors involved, motives 
(interest), institutions and effects associated with it. The findings give an enhanced 
understanding of resources grabbing in terms of the conceptual and analytical frameworks 
within the tenets of political ecology and economy by comparing land, water and ocean 
grabbing.  
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Finally, this research serves to impart knowledge and support future research and policy 
formulation within the context of resource grabbing The thesis also serves to provide new 
knowledge to improve understanding of the subject matter and to provide a basis for future 
research. 
  
1.4 Methods 
 
1.4.1 Research Approach 
 
The thesis employed critical review of secondary literature to elicit the required data to 
meet the objectives of the thesis. This involves an extensive literature review and drawing 
inferences primarily from secondary sources. A desktop study was mainly used in 
reviewing these literatures. This was done by identify key journal articles and other 
manuscripts and writing annotated bibliographies of sources that cover the topics of land, 
water and ocean grabbing, particularly literature on those that provided information to meet 
the research objectives. 
 
1.4.2 Literature Requirements and Sources 
 
Data for the thesis were gathered from secondary sources, which include academic and 
grey literature on land, water and ocean grabbing. The data were obtained from books, 
published reports, bulletins, periodicals, newspapers and journals, conference papers, and 
published and unpublished theses. Most of these data were obtained from online using the 
Google Scholar search engine. The search was done by using key words that related to the 
concepts of land, water and ocean grabbing, the actors involved and their interests, 
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institutional frameworks and effects associated with these concepts of resource grabbing. 
The analytical framework of political ecology was mainly based on books by Paul Robbins 
obtained from the university library. 
Table 1.1Categories and Source of Data 
Research Objective  Data Required  Data Source  Method of 
Acquisition  
To explain the concept 
of resource grabbing 
within the context of: 
-Land grabbing 
-Water grabbing and 
-Ocean grabbing 
 
- Definitions of land, 
water and ocean 
resources 
- Definitions of land, 
water and ocean 
grabbing 
- Key features of 
land, water and 
ocean grabbing 
- Effects of land 
grabbing 
 
Books, journal articles, 
reports, newspapers, 
periodicals, thesis reports 
Desk study 
 
 
 
To analyze and 
compare land, water 
and ocean grabbing; 
and 
 
-Political ecology 
and economy 
frameworks 
-Robbins’ Five thesis 
of political ecology 
-Hudson and 
Leftwich framework 
for political economy 
analysis 
Books, Journals Desk study 
To suggest policy 
recommendations 
towards curbing land, 
water and ocean 
grabbing 
-Human rights 
approaches to ocean 
land grabbing 
-Human rights 
approaches to water 
-Human right 
approaches to the 
ocean 
Journals, articles, reports, 
online news articles 
Desk study 
Source: Authors’ Construct, 2016 
 
These data from the secondary sources provided information on the conceptual and 
analytical frameworks most appropriate for the research objectives.  
 
About 90 percent of the literature used backdated to within the last 10 years of publications. 
However, the remaining 10 percent, which goes beyond 10 years, provided empirical 
8 
 
information that was critical to the achievement of the research objectives. The research is 
dated back within the last 10 years because the issue of resource grabbing gained global 
recognition around 2007/08.  
 
Conflicting data on figures from most of the academic literature, particularly on the sizes 
of land grabbed in the South, limited heavy reliance on figures for the research. However, 
the figures used in support of the arguments in this research came from grey literature such 
as GRAIN et al., 2014. 
 
1.4.3 Analysis 
 
The three cases of land, water and ocean grabbing form the basis of the comparative 
analysis. The comparison involves an analysis of the interplay of actors, their interests, 
institutional frameworks and the effects access the cases of land, water and ocean grabbing. 
This analysis has been aided through the engagement of conceptual frameworks within the 
tenets of political ecology and political economy. 
 
Conceptual frameworks, in general, according to Miles and Huberman (1994) describe 
what relationships may exist between and among concepts based on logic, theory and/or 
experience. This analysis focused on providing theoretical explanations of resource 
grabbing (land, water and ocean) in the Global South. The analysis uses a theoretical 
framework that is built on political ecology and political economy to identify the interplay 
between actors, interest, institutions and effects of resource grabbing. 
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The analysis of resource grabbing was developed within the context of the five themes or 
theses of political ecology identified by Robbins (2012). The first involves the degradation 
and marginalization thesis, which focuses on the over-exploitation of resources in the 
Global South as a result of development intervention or to meet market demand (e.g., land 
grabbing for biofuel or food production). The second thesis focuses on the conservation 
and control of resources, mainly from resource owners to achieve sustainability of parks 
and protected areas. This is in line with where resources are grabbed with the stated reason 
that such resources are under-utilized and that there is the need to increase efficiency in the 
use of such resources. 
 
Robbins identified environmental conflict and exclusion as the third thesis. Robbins reveals 
that with this thesis, environmental problems become “socialized” when groups such as 
state authorities, private firms, or social elites secure control of collective resources at the 
expense of others by leveraging management interventions by development authorities, 
state agents, or private firms (Robins, 2012). Environmental subjects and identity 
constitutes the fourth thesis, which basically involves the emergence of social or political 
movements that, within the context of this research, emerge in response to resource 
grabbing. The fifth and the final thesis identify political objects and actors. 
 
These five theses identified by Robbins also shed light on structures, institutions, 
actors/stakeholders, and politics. The research will, therefore, employ Hudson and 
Leftwich (2014) framework of political economy analysis to identify structures, 
institutions, and stakeholders (actors) involving resource grabbing. The political economy 
analysis by Hudson and Leftwich sheds light on the interplay of actors and their interest 
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and institutional frameworks while Robbins’ five theses helps uncover political ecology 
themes such as struggles associated with resource access, social marginalization and 
ecological degradation.  
 
1.5 Organization of the Thesis 
 
 The research is divided into seven chapters. The first chapter introduced the research by 
providing a background and objectives of the study. It also introduces the scope and 
justification of the research as well as the methods employed in carrying out the research. 
 
Chapter two focuses on the theoretical frameworks that was used for analyzing and 
conceptualizing resource grabbing by looking at the theoretical approaches in the fields of 
political ecology and political economy. The chapter provides a preliminary framework 
within which the research questions around resource grabbing are analyzed. Chapters three, 
four and five provide a critical literature review on the concepts of land, water and ocean 
grabbing, including actors involved and their interests, institutions and institutional 
frameworks and effects associated with land, water and ocean grabbing respectively. These 
chapters argue that an understanding of resource grabbing can be enhanced by specifying 
the actors, interests (motives), and institutions across the cases.  
 
Chapter six provides answers to the research questions by providing an explanation of what 
constitutes resource grabbing and a comparative analysis involving land, water and ocean 
grabbing. The chapter also provides a political ecology synthesis of resource grabbing. The 
chapter ends by summarizing recommendations for natural resource management in the 
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Global South. The final chapter briefly provides a summary and conclusion of the research 
and proposes areas for future research. 
 
1.6 Limitations of the Thesis 
 
The thesis has several limitations. The first limitation is the large volume of literature on 
land and water grabbing relative to ocean grabbing. The extensive literature review 
determined that there is substantially more research on both land and water grabbing than 
on ocean grabbing. That literature contained different figures and revelations from different 
sources which made it difficult to ascertain the authenticity of some of the facts presented 
in some of the research works. The research, however, overcame that by reducing the use 
of quantitative data associated with especially land grabbing. Related, the lack of secondary 
sources on ocean grabbing made it more difficulty to make strong conclusions about the 
patterns of resource grabbing in that sector.  
 
Secondly, much effort was spent in making sense of large volumes of secondary data to 
meet the objectives of the research. There were instances where the original sources of 
some of the revelations in the literature could not be traced. Thus, the author ended up 
omitting some potentially important information which could not be verified. 
 
Finally, proposing policy recommendations for land, water and ocean grabbing faced the 
challenge of how to analyze many different natural resources policies in some very 
different countries and contexts, particularly in the Global South. A future research project 
called "Cases of Land, Water and Ocean Policies and their Implications for Resource 
12 
 
Grabbing in the Global South" is proposed to identify the influence of land, water and 
ocean policies on resource grabbing in the Global South. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORKS 
 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
 
This chapter introduces theoretical frameworks that form the basis of analysis of the thesis. 
The chapter engages specific approaches of political ecology and political economy and 
assesses their utility for understanding resource grabbing debates. Robbins’ theses of 
political ecology are engaged in order to integrate social and ecological effects of resource 
grabbing that political economy analyses tend to miss. The political economy analysis, 
however, helps identify how the interests of the various actors influence institutions and 
institutional frameworks implicated in resource grabbing. 
 
2.2 Political Ecology 
 
The term political ecology is a generic term that encompasses a range of definitions 
(Robbins, 2012). Over the past three decades, political ecology has evolved from an 
inherently structuralist mode of class analysis involving a series of analyses between the 
exploited poor in a given locality and the normally distant exploiters (Blaikie and 
Brookfield, 1987) towards what has been described as 'progressive contextualization' 
(Bryant, 2001). Political ecology has focused on environmental changes between the causal 
agents and those who are most affected by these changes. 
 
This research takes the definitions of political ecology as defined by scholars such as 
Zimmerer, Bryant, Escoba and Blaikie, and Brookfield. Zimmerer (2000, cited in Forsyth, 
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2004) defines political ecology as the social and political conditions surrounding the 
causes, experiences, and management of environmental problems. These environmental 
conditions are established analytically by studying the relationships between society and 
nature in contexts of power, particularly from the perspective of political economy 
(Escoba, 1996). Bryant (1992: 13 cited in Forsyth, 2004), describes political ecology as an 
inquiry into “the political forces, conditions, and ramifications of environmental change”. 
According to Forsyth (2004), this may include studies of environmental impacts from 
different sources; location-specific aspects of ecological change; and the effects of 
environmental change on socio-economic and political relationships. 
 
Much debate on political ecology has focused on the social justice dimensions of 
environmental disputes and resource struggles in developing countries (e.g. Escobar, 1995; 
Robbins, 2004, 2012; Watts, 2000).  This is because such environmental conflicts involve 
the interaction of a variety of actors from state, society, and industry in locations considered 
to be of global environmental significance. Political ecology in the developing world has 
reflected the belief that injustices are being committed against both local people and 
environmental resources that may be of value to these people or to the world at large (Peet 
and Watts, 1996). It is within this context that recent literature (GRAIN et al., 2014; Hall, 
2013) describes resource grabbing in the Global South.   
 
Political ecologist Paul Robbins (2012) developed five theses of political ecology (see 
Table 2.1) as far as human interactions with natural resources are concerned. The first thesis 
involves degradation and marginalization and focuses on the over-exploitation of resource 
in the Global South as a result of development intervention or to meet market demand (e.g., 
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land grabbing for biofuel or food production). This leads to poverty and/or other forms of 
social marginalization on the part of those whose resources have been exploited. The 
categories of actors include peasant farmers (exploited through land and water grabbing), 
artisanal fishers (exploited through ocean) and local communities. As a result, access to 
important resources needed for food, medicinal and cultural purposes are limited.  
 
The first thesis also emphasizes the possibility of sustainable communities potentially 
becoming unsustainable as a result of state bureaucrats or foreign control of common 
properties such as  
 
Table 2.1: Robbin’s Five Thesis of Political Ecology 
Theses of Political 
Ecology 
Explanations 
Marginalization and 
Degradation 
 Resource exploitation 
 Resource degradation 
 Poverty on affected groups 
 Affects community sustainability 
Conservation and Control  Resource control from minority groups 
 Interests of bureaucrats are protected in the name of 
environmental protection 
 Local systems and livelihoods are disabled 
 Draws upon four fundamental theoretical foundations 
Environmental Conflict 
and Exclusion 
 Socialization of environmental problems  
 Rooted in three fundamental lessons drawn from feminist 
theory, property research, and critical development studies 
Environmental Subjects 
and Identity 
 Emergence of social or political movements 
 Emergence of new kinds of people 
 Emergence of new understandings of the world, ecological 
ideologies and behaviors 
 Lack of trust on the part of local resource holders 
Political Objects and 
Actors 
 Management of resources is a political activity  
 Transformation of actors as a result of interactions 
between resources and humans 
 Emergence of resistance from traditional, local groups or 
progressive human/non-human alliances 
Source: Contracted from Paul Robbins Five Theses of Political Ecology 
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ocean-based fisheries. Chapman (1989), for example, reveals that the current changing 
relationship between common property and private resources in the Amazon profoundly 
affects the degree of exploitation that is experienced by the region's fisheries. This 
according to Chapman has important implications for the survival of Amazonia's flood-
forests which play a critical role in the region's fisheries ecology. A political ecology of the 
Amazon forest stresses the context within which tree-cutting occurs in the forest and the 
relationships between the marginalized communities and the loss of tree cover. 
 
Using an explicit Marxist, materialist interpretation towards the struggle for control of the 
forest between powerful groups, Schmink and Wood (1987, 1992), state that as class 
stratification increase under conditions of market expansion, an increasingly hierarchical 
arrangement of groups will struggle over the ‘surplus’ that comes out of the forest leading 
to over-exploitation of forest resources. As the indigenous groups and the peasant farmers 
are drawn into market economies, the result is that indigenous groups are pushed aside for 
investors who have the capital to invest in such resources. This is further compounded 
when the state is involved as it may result in the interest of solely the elites being served 
and also encourages further resource exploitation. This process of capitalist enclosure and 
modernization results in degradation of forest resources and marginalization of indigenous 
resource users. 
 
The second thesis focuses on the conservation and control of resources, mainly from 
resource owners, to achieve sustainability. This involves taking over the control of 
resources usually from the minority groups, (associated with class, gender, or ethnicity), 
such as peasant farmers, small-scale fishers, and local communities. This process has 
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manifested by disabling local systems of livelihood production and socio-political 
organizations by state bureaucrats and protecting global interests in the name of 
environmental protection. This is in line with resource grabbing, particularly relating to 
ocean resources, where certain restrictions are introduced by state officials with the reason 
of environmental protections and with an often hidden aim of control of such resources 
(Robbins, 2012). A typical instance is the institutionalization of Marine Protected Areas 
(MPA), which places restrictions or bans in certain marine areas previously occupied for 
the purpose of marine protection and conservation. MPAs are one of the major mechanisms 
through which ocean grabbing occurs as identified by Franco et al. (2014). 
 
The conservation and control thesis of political ecology does not suggest opposition to the 
defense of ambient ecological systems, biodiversity or protection of environmental 
systems, but focuses on the extent to which such practices have failed in achieving its 
common aim, have negative social effects, or are driven by other interests. The failure is a 
result of the instruments of conservation, which have disenfranchised traditional land 
managers and served the goals, desires, and interests of powerful actors in society who 
hold little or no investment in the ecosystem resources (Robbins, 2012). 
 
Robbins (2012) identifies environmental conflict and exclusion as the third thesis. Robbins 
reveals that with this thesis, environmental problems become ‘socialized’ when groups 
such as states, investors and elites secure control of collective resources at the expense of 
others by leveraging management interventions. This results in exclusion of prior resource 
users. The end result is an attempt to protect and secure their resources, sometimes leading 
to conflicts and violence. 
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The argument of environmental conflict and exclusion is rooted in three fundamental 
lessons which are drawn from feminist theory, property research, and critical development 
studies. The first argument posits that social systems are structured around divisions of 
labor and power that differentially distribute access and responsibility for natural goods 
and systems. This system of division of labor includes issues of power such as who controls 
what; who is allowed to decide on what; and who is expected to do what tasks. Struggles 
and conflicts arise when the interests of others are enhanced at the expense of others, such 
as a minority group based on ethnicity, class and gender (Robbins, 2004:174). 
 
The second argument reflects an understanding of property systems as complex bundles of 
rights that are politically partial and historically contingent. In this argument, the ownership 
of resources tends to be divided into an array of rights that may be exclusive to an 
individual or shared with a group. This includes the separate rights to possess, use, manage, 
and control income from use and control of capital. Privatization of such rights without 
following due process commonly results in conflicts, production losses and increasing 
inequality. The final argument draws on the historical experience of development activities 
that show them to be rooted in specific assumptions about class, race, and gender 
participation in the development process, often resulting in poorly formed policy and 
uneven results (Robbins, 2004). 
 
Environmental subjects and identity constitute the fourth thesis, which basically involves 
the emergence of social or political movements. Such movements and local political 
associations have emerged due to institutionalized and power-laden environmental 
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management regimes which have led to the emergence of new kinds of identities, with their 
own emerging self - definitions, understandings of the world, and ecological ideologies 
and behaviors. This came partly as a result of lack of trust on the part of local resource 
holders in politicians who have been mandated to protect them and their resources (Robins, 
2004).  
 
The last thesis identifies political objects and actors involved in resources management. 
According to the thesis, the non-human nature of resources and human interactions and the 
quest to control such resources have made resource management a political activity.  The 
thesis further notes that these characteristics and agents (politicians, bureaucrats, and 
private firms) assume new roles and take on new importance since they are also 
transformed by these interactions between resources and humans. These transformations 
have resulted in a certain level of power and influence in controlling the access and use of 
resources with its unintended consequences and pernicious results. In the process, 
resistance emerges from traditional, local environmental groups or progressive human/non-
human alliances by people marginalized and exploited by such efforts (especially along 
lines of class, ethnicity, and gender); hence the rampant manifestation of violence and 
environmental securities associated with resource grabbing (Robbins, 2012).  
These five theses by Paul Robbins were not proposed within the tenets of resource grabbing 
per say but are situation to explain land, water and ocean grabbing. The analysis of this 
thesis takes into consideration the five theses of political ecology and points out how these 
theses can help us understand and compare different forms of resource grabbing. A political 
economy analysis, moreover, helps identify particular actors, interests, and institutions so 
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as to provide further analytical and explanatory strength to both the political ecology theses 
and the comparative analysis.   
 
2.3 Political Economy Analysis 
 
In terms of resource grabbing debates, political economy analysis involves “how power 
and resources are distributed and contested in different contexts and provides insights into 
underlying interests, incentives, rules and institutions” (Haider and Rao, 2010: 4). Political 
economy analysis, according to DFID (2009: 4),   
Pays particular attention to politics, understood in terms of contestation and 
bargaining between interest groups with competing claims to rights and resources. 
However, it is equally concerned with the economic processes that generate wealth, 
and that influence how political choices are made. In reality, these processes are 
closely inter-related and form part of a unified set of dynamics which influence 
development outcomes.  
 
The aim is to analyze, in detail, how political systems function in countries including 
control, access and utilization of resources and to draw implications for assistance 
strategies and aid delivery (Landell-Mills et al., 2007). 
 
Hudson and Leftwich (2014) explain that political economy is also a matter of managing 
the distributional consequences of institutional change. This change is influenced by social, 
political, economic and environmental choices that are guided by the interests of 
individuals and organizations; for them, political economy presents a framework for 
conducting empirical analysis on how existing political institutions and actors actually 
work in terms of this choice making.  
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Hudson and Leftwich (2014) also suggest that political economy analysis evolved through 
three main approaches with the first generation starting from the early 1990s. The “first 
generation” mainly addressed issues of ‘governance’ particularly with an emphasis on the 
reasons for the absence of “good governance”. This is largely from a technical, 
administrative, managerial, capacity-building and subsequently, public sector management 
perspective. However, the first generation was criticized for being unsatisfactory in 
addressing the deeper processes of history and politics that shaped development prospects 
and outcomes. This resulted in developing the second generation approach that responded 
to the weakness of the first generation (Hudson and Leftwich, 2014). 
 
The second generation came out with tools that were crucial in more explicitly bringing in 
the role of political actors, institutions, and structures in order to map out the context for 
development interventions. The development of these tools was driven by a desire to 
understand where political support, and political will, lies in a country or sector. Typical 
of such tools include the DFID’s Drivers of Change, Sida’s Power Analysis, and the Dutch 
SGACA work (Strategic Governance and Corruption Analysis). The approach is much 
credited with bringing politics back in, by means of greater emphasis on historical, 
structural, institutional and political elements that shaped the context within which actors 
worked. Even though these tools were considered as political economy analysis, Hudson 
and Leftwich, however, argue that they were too general to provide operationally relevant 
insights, and tended to suffer from analytical and methodological incoherence; they 
therefore suggest the second generation is not fit to be considered as a fully holistic political 
economy approach (Hudson and Leftwich, 2014). 
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The response to the concerns raised in the second generation was the emergence of a new 
political economy approach, developed within assumptions and methodological tools of 
economics. The “third generation” emphasizes the way in which institutional incentives 
shape behavior to produce positive or dysfunctional developmental outcomes.  Third 
generation political economy analysis emphasizes that there is always a conflict between 
competing interests. Those who have power will seek to defend their advantage, and those 
who are disadvantaged will be marginalized (Hudson and Leftwich, 2014).  
 
The third generation rests on three main core principles namely, interests, institutions and 
incentives. Self-interest serves as a major motivator for actions to be initiated and tends to 
influence behaviours and outcomes. For example, the motivation of a politician is to get 
elected and to stay in power so as to have an influence on how things should be governed 
while bureaucrats are driven by expanding their power, duties, staff and budgets. From this 
perspective, competition for self-interest brings about dynamics in society in terms of how 
changes should occur (Hudson and Leftwich, 2014). 
 
Institutions are required to achieve meaningful interest. Institutions provide the necessary 
social infrastructure to harness and channel self-interest: they act as the coordination 
mechanism for mutually productive outcomes. Institutions provide frameworks within 
which peace, justice, and stability for the economy and policy function without disruption. 
Issues of laws, contracts, property rights and the economy are upheld by institutions. Strong 
institutions and instructional frameworks, therefore, form an important backbone of how 
resources are managed in an economy. This implies that in cases where there are 
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completions of achieving self-interest, solid institutions are needed to regulate changes that 
will be necessitated by such interests. A case of weak institutions amidst high rates of self-
interest is, therefore, tantamount to antidevelopment (Hudson and Leftwich, 2014).  
 
Institutions generate incentives which can have both positive and negative impacts on 
institutional coordination and wealth-creation. For instance, good institutions incentivize 
coordination and wealth-creation, whereas missing or bad institutions incentivize self-
seeking and socially perverse outcomes. Incentives are the external stimuli of rewards and 
punishments that are related to certain types of actions (Ostrom et al., 2002). Altering the 
institutional framework entails changing the incentive structure and has been an essential 
condition for the reduction in the uncertainties of the environment over time. It has been 
the major tool by which humans have attempted deliberately to alter their environment. 
This means that self-seeking interest functioning on weak institutions (altered institutions) 
tend to halt the developmental process. Good institutions play a crucial bridging role such 
as aligning incentives for individual self-interested behavior with publicly beneficial 
outcomes (Hudson and Leftwich, 2014). 
 
In summary, Hudson and Leftwich (2014) believe that political economy analysis should 
focus on identifying the structures within a particular geographical context as well as 
institutions and actors/stakeholders that operate within these structures. The approach 
includes a focus on interests and ideologies of actors/stakeholders, which combine with 
both formal and informal institutions that govern behavior. In this approach, individual 
interests and institutional incentives interact with structures to produce pro- or anti-
developmental outcomes.  Hudson and Leftwich framework for political analysis 
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emphasizes how agency, structural and institutional context combine to produce political 
action and outcomes. The heart of the analysis involves how societal structures interact 
with institutions and actors/stakeholders to produce political outcomes. This means 
examining how actors’/stakeholders’ interests are channeled through the institutional 
powers they face – that is, how both formal and informal institutional powers are able to 
shape the interest and ideas of actors/stakeholders to produce political outcomes. 
 
It is therefore very important that the interests of the various actors/stakeholders in the 
resource grabbing debates are analyzed. It is essential to understand who the key players 
are in land, water and ocean grabbing, what their respective interests are, and what their 
capacities are for defending or challenging the status quo of institutions and structures. As 
examined in the remainder of this thesis, institutions, both formal and informal, play 
important roles as far as shaping how actors and interests emerge and evolve in resource 
grabbing in the Global South. Formal institutions include legal systems, property rights, 
tax systems, and their enforcement mechanisms while informal institutions include cultural 
practices and social norms. Incentives, as the rewards and benefits, such as resources, that 
accrue from pursuing certain courses of action, and how they are generated by the 
institutional rules of the game are also analyzed bel 
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Figure 2.1: Framework for Political Economy Analysis 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Hudson and Leftwich, 2014:107 
 
 
2.4 Application of the Analytical Frameworks 
 
The political economy analysis runs through the chapters of land, water and ocean grabbing 
by identifying stakeholders (actors), motives (interests), institutions and institutional 
frameworks (e.g., weaknesses in laws and policies) and effects of resource grabbing. The 
analysis explores how the interests of actors influence institutional and regulatory 
frameworks which results in resource grabbing.  
 
The effects are then discussed along the first three of Robbins’ theses – marginalization 
and degradation; conservation and control; and environmental conflicts. This is because 
the first three theses provide vivid descriptions of the effects of resource grabbing. This is 
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not to say that Paul Robbins’ five theses are explicitly designed to explain the effects of 
resource grabbing. However, the thesis seeks to identify features of effects associated with 
the different types of resource grabbing by using the five theses of political ecology as 
analytical tools. 
 
The discussion section employs an analysis of the key features of land, water and ocean 
grabbing. This is based on a comparative analysis on the different types of resource 
grabbing – land, water and the oceans – focusing on actors, interests, institutional 
frameworks and effects. To ensure that policy formulation involves the interplay of 
structures, institutions, stakeholders and political analysis, the political economy analysis 
framework of Hudson and Lefwich is used in proposing an approach for policy formulation 
towards curbing resource grabbing. Hence, Leftwich and Hudson’s political economy 
analysis framework establishes the interplay of actors, their interests and how these shape 
institutions and institutional frameworks to bring about resource grabbing.  This aids in 
proposing an approach towards policy formulation intended to curb resource grabbing. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
LAND GRABBING 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
The purpose of the chapter is to analyze land grabbing, which is a major phenomenon 
within the context of resource grabbing. Land grabbing deserves special attention and a 
greater deal of space in this thesis for two reasons. First, the resource grabbing concept 
emerged primarily from the explosion in land grabbing in the last decade. Second, and 
related, research on land grabbing is far more developed than research on water grabbing 
and ocean grabbing.  
 
This chapter takes a critical look at the key debates surrounding land grabbing. Issues such 
as land as a resource, land grabbing as a concept, actors, institutions and institutional 
frameworks and effects of land grabbing will be discussed in this chapter.  The chapter 
analyzes the political economy of land grabbing to identify the interplay of political 
structures, institutional powers, and the interests of actors/stakeholders, particularly 
resource grabbers. These interests, such as interests in land acquisition, is matched with the 
themes of political ecology developed by Robbins to better explain the effects that emanate 
from resource grabbing within the tenets of the five theses  
 
3.2 Land as a Political Object 
 
The question of ‘what is land?’ can be answered by engaging in Hall (2013)’s political 
economy analysis. To Hall, there is nothing more concrete and obvious in terms of the 
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definition of land than the ground beneath our feet. Li (2014) also sees land as a strange 
object. Although land is often treated as a thing and sometimes as a commodity, it is not 
like a mat: you cannot roll it up and take it away, indicating that land is fixed in nature. 
Both Hall and Li suggest that to turn it to productive use requires regimes of exclusion that 
distinguish legitimate from illegitimate uses and users, and the inscribing of boundaries 
through devices such as fences, title deeds, laws, zones, regulations, landmarks and story-
lines that distinguish between ownership among individuals, institutions, and states.  
 
There are key fundamental aspects that differentiate land from other resources, however 
(Hall, 2013).  Land is fixed and cannot move as most resources. Land cannot be exported 
or even relocated to the next place or down the road even if its constituents such as the soil 
or the minerals could be moved. For this reason, a person who wants to make physical use 
of land must move to it and not otherwise. This feature of land makes it impossible to 
concentrate its control at one point in the ‘commodity chain’ unlike other resources (Hall 
2013). 
 
Secondly, land, unlike other natural resources, is extremely heterogeneous. In this feature, 
Hall likens land to labor and asserts that its price or value depends on the location and the 
quality of it. For instance, according to him, several kilometers of land elsewhere may 
value literally nothing compared to few square meters located in central business districts. 
With this, the demand of land in one part of the world will not be followed by a similar 
movement elsewhere (Hall, 2013). 
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Hall also identifies control over land as indispensable to almost all human activity as the 
third difference between land and other natural resources. This means that some form of 
control over land is extended to both (though not applicable to all resources) non-renewable 
resources (e.g. uranium, iron ore, and coltan) and renewable resources (e.g. water, soil and 
trees). This is particularly true in a terrestrial environment where land control grants control 
over ecosystems. By this feature, the land is largely associated with everything in space 
such as agriculture, industry, infrastructure, and tourism (Hall, 2013). 
Land again differs from other resources by virtue of it being commonly rented. Land, 
unlike other resources, cannot be consumed through its use and this explains why holders 
of a piece of land are sometimes willing to lend such land to someone. For example, 
situations where a piece of land is overused, polluted or degraded does not take away the 
name ‘land’. The land is normally rented for a long period of time for major resource 
development and the normal lease periods for agriculture, forestry and mining respectively 
are 30, 50 and 99 years (Hall, 2013). 
 
Finally, land differs from other resources as a result of the power and depth of the 
attachment people feel to it. This is true in cases of the kind of emotional attachments 
people have with their farmlands, family homes, range or cottage. People also hold strong 
ties to their place or birth or where they grew up. Such attachments are even connected to 
their cultural values and practice and such people will go to great lengths to protect such 
lands from being taken (Hall, 2013). 
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3.3 The Concept of Land Grabbing 
 
Current scholarly research and policy analysis in academic and grey literatures are 
characterized by explicit and implicit differences over the structures, interest of 
stakeholders, institutions, power and implications of contemporary land deals. Among the 
issues contested include what to include in the definition of land grabs; how to account and 
measure such land deals; how to understand the process of change; and what are the range 
of actors involved (Edelman et al., 2013).  
 
The land grab concept stems from a longer-term agrarian crisis linking the British-centered 
food regime to the current process of capitalist restructuring of the corporate food regime 
as land grabbing takes hold (McMichael, 2013). British imperialism was marked almost 
from its inception by the idea that taking over land for productive purposes was an act of 
“improvement” (with an original intention of making a profit) that will benefit all 
humankind (Hall, 2013). This British land acquisition was justified by the argument that 
lands were not being used efficiently by the natives and, therefore, constituted wastage of 
nature’s bounty. For instance, Deininger et al. (2011) report that none of the African 
countries is now achieving more than 30 percent of the potential yield on currently 
cultivated areas, reproducing colonial justifications for land restructuring. 
 
The acquisition of land by foreign governments and foreign firms is, therefore, a centuries’ 
old process in the world (Sassen, 2013). While this can be seen merely as a continuation 
of an old practice, the available evidence (Anseeuw et al., 2012b; Land Matrix, 2012; 
Borras et al., 2011; FAO, 2011; UNTCAD, 2009) points to a significant change in the 
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curve describing the size of overall acquisitions in the last decade.  Many attempts have 
been made to understand land grabs from various perspectives, such as their structural and 
institutional origins (Zoomers, 2010), states’ role in land grabbing (Basu, 2007), and the 
conflicts that they create between different actors/stakeholders, particularly grabbers and 
land occupants (Grajales, 2011).  
 
The definition of land grabbing in these recent times has sparked considerable debates in 
academic and policy circles (Borras and Franco, 2011; Cotula, 2012; White et al., 2012; 
Margulis et al., 2013). Depending on the particular framing of land grabbing, and who is 
doing the framing, its actors (stakeholders), drivers (interests), and scope will vary 
significantly, and with this the breadth and depth of the regulatory interventions proposed 
by different actors (Künnemann and Suárez, 2013).  
 
A study conducted by the FAO  on land grabbing in Latin America and the Caribbean used 
the following standard definition, arguing that land deals are to be understood as land grabs 
when three conditions are present, namely: the scale of land deals should be large (using a 
commonly accepted baseline of a minimum of a thousand hectares for a single deal); there 
should be the direct involvement of foreign governments and institutions, and the new land 
investments are seen to have a negative impact on the food security of the recipient country. 
Of the three conditions, the most important are the second (Gomez, 2011). Borras et al. 
(2012), however, criticized the definition on the basis of being narrow and bound to miss 
significant aspects of the scope and extent of contemporary land grabbing and possible 
trajectories of agrarian change. For this reason, they believe that a food or food crisis-
centered analysis of land grabbing is problematic. 
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Borras et al. also argue that defining land grabbing too broadly will miss what is distinctive 
in this particular wave of contemporary global land grabbing and for that matter proposed 
three key interlinked defining features of contemporary land grabbing. Borras et al. 
describe land grabbing as essentially ‘control grabbing’ as the first feature. This feature 
describes the power to control land and other associated resources (also see Rulli, et al., 
2102; Woodhouse, 2012) such as water in order to derive benefit from such control. They 
identified land grabs (capture of vast tracts of lands), “water grabs” (capture of water 
resources) and “green grabs” (similar to Robbins’ conservation and control thesis), as ways 
in which control grabbing are manifested.  
 
The second feature of describing contemporary land grabbing takes into consideration the 
scale of land grabbing. They argue that land grabbing should not be limited to the dominant 
view in terms of size but rather point to broadly distinct but interlinked dimensions, 
namely: the scale of land acquisitions and the scale of capital involved (also see Hall, 
2013).  The third and the final feature of land grabbing occurs basically through the 
dynamics of capital accumulation strategies responding to the convergence of multiple 
crises that occur either nationally or internationally. Such crises include food, energy/fuel, 
climate change and financial crises (Hall, 2013; GRAIN et al., 2014). 
 
Based on the above-mentioned interlinked features of land grabbing as identified by Borras 
et al., the authors define contemporary land grabbing as  
The capturing and control of relatively vast tracts of land and other natural 
resources through a variety of mechanisms and forms involving large-scale capital 
that often shifts resource use to that of extraction, whether for international or 
domestic purposes, as capital’s response to the convergence of food, energy and 
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financial crises, climate change mitigation, imperatives and demands for resources 
from newer hubs of global capital” (Borras et al., 2012:405).  
 
Land grabbing is defined similarly by Akram-Lodhi (2012:125), who suggests it is the 
“large-scale acquisition through buying, leasing or otherwise accessing productively used 
or potentially arable farmland by corporate investors to produce food and non-food crops, 
in order either to boost supply for domestic and/or world markets or obtain a favorable 
financial return on an investment”. This definition of land grabbing refers to it as a new 
form of colonialism that has intensified within the past few years, initially in response to 
the 2007–2008 increase in food prices (Rulli et al., 2013) and also shares vital features of 
contemporary land grabbing as identified by Borras et al. 
 
GRAIN et al. (2014) add to the debates on the definition of land grabbing by revealing that 
recent studies emphasize the links between land grabbing, biomass extraction, and the 
interests and needs of the few members of a global class of consumers distributed across 
an increasingly multi-centric global food system, against the vast majority of the world’s 
population. GRAIN et al. thus claim that the fight against land grabbing currently lies at 
the interface of four debates, namely the climate debate, food sovereignty, indigenous 
rights, social and environmental justice. While GRAIN et al. attribute the fight against land 
grabs to these aforementioned four debates, Anseeuw et al. (2012b) reveals three factors 
that distinguish the previous factors related to the recent rush for global farmland, including 
the scope and size of the land grabs; the new motivations of a bio-economy; and the new 
actors and their configurations involved.  
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From the arguments presented by the authors on debates on the definition of land grabbing, 
there is no doubt that land grabbing in recent times takes into consideration the key features 
identified in Borras et al. (2012), though the literature has identified a wide range of issues 
and factors associated with land grabbing. Synthesizing the literature, the following three 
key factors are arguably most important for understanding land grabbing in recent times.  
 
Stakeholders (Actors) 
 
The first one being the size of land grabbed and the actors involved. Such sizes (see World 
Bank, 2011) involve large-scale land acquisition depending on the size of land available 
for those who depend on that land and how much is being grabbed. In terms of the actors 
involved, three key actors have been identified, domestic governments, international 
organizations, and private investors (usually from external sources). In most cases, 
governments within the states (where there is a land grab) play a vital role in making lands 
available to domestic and foreign corporations and foreign governments (Hall, 2013). 
 
Operations of Institutional Frameworks 
 
Secondly, there is a control of resources (land) with a motive of making use of and gaining 
something either directly (i.e. putting the land into productive use) or indirectly - other 
resources or benefits that can be obtained from the land such as water or mineral resources. 
Such control is normally exercised by the actors who are usually more powerful than those 
whose lands are being grabbed.  Institutional frameworks, including land policies, 
contribute to the control of land away from small-scale land holders. This is because large-
scale land investments look appealing to the politicians and the bureaucrats with the power 
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to approve policies that either protect small-scale holders or dispossess them. These powers 
are sometimes influenced by personal benefits or national economic interest (Hall, 2013).  
 
Interests 
 
 
The third factor shaping land grabbing involves motives or interests, with such motives 
either for private benefit or to deal with national or global crisis. The private financial 
benefits occur where finance capital started to look for new and safer investment 
opportunities (McMichael, 2013). National or global crisis may be in the areas of lands for 
food production to meet anticipated future food crisis and biofuel energy production to 
reduce the heavy reliance on fossil fuels.  
 
On the basis of key debates surrounding what land grabbing entails, Künnemann and 
Suárez. (2013) reveal five areas or set of cases that are behind the motives of actors towards 
land grabbing.  
 
Interest in Mineral Resources 
 
The first set of interests with an international dimension as revealed by the Künnemann 
and Suárez (2013) are land acquisitions related to mining by companies with headquarters 
in OECD countries. This was attributed to the increased global demand for raw materials 
which has resulted in land struggles over areas rich in mineral resources. These demands 
for resource-rich lands are not only attributed to states in the North as the main actors but 
also states and mining firms in the South. 
 
Interest in Infrastructural Development 
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This relates to large-scale infrastructure development such as the construction of dams for 
hydropower and irrigation purposes, airports, highways, and harbors. This normally stems 
from industrialization and urbanization which have resulted in forced displacement and the 
conversion of agricultural land for developmental purposes known as urban sprawl and 
infrastructure development (Stanley, 2009). The main international actors involved in these 
cases according to the Künnemann and Suárez are the international financial institutions 
(IFIs), such as the World Bank, regional development banks, and international banks that 
provide project support. Developing countries in the South in their attempts to embrace 
these large-scale projects from the IFIs make large tracks of land available for the purpose 
of attracting these projects. More recently, the entry of state development banks and private 
companies from the ‘BRICSA’ (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) group has 
been identified as emerging powers of new players in the world of project finance and 
major infrastructure. 
 
Interest in Agricultural Production 
 
Interest in agricultural production has been identified to be common in recent times and 
usually comprises cases of foreign investors taking control of people’s lands for 
commercial agricultural production for food, feed, and fuel. In this category, Künnemann 
and Suárez (2013) mentioned cases of OECD investors acquiring land in Southern 
countries for the production of agricultural commodities such as coffee (e.g. Mubende 
region in Uganda), the production of rice (e.g. Yala Swamp area in Kenya), and forest 
plantations (e.g. Niassa province in Mozambique). Other cases include the acquisition of 
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700,000 hectares of land by Saudi Arabia’s Binladin Group in six West African countries; 
800,000 hectares of land in Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay by Tejar (a company jointly 
owned by London-based hedge fund and an American private equity fund) (Hall, 2013). 
 
According to Hall (2013), the key trigger for these cases of land was the massive spike in 
commodity prices that took place in 2007/8. During these years, the dramatic increase in 
basic food prices resulted in a reduction of access to food for millions of people as they 
reached the highest levels in 30 years (FAO, 2008). Prices of rice, maize, soyabeans and 
petroleum rose by 19, 43, 48 and 66 percent respectively between January and May 2008. 
This encouraged many investors to look for arable lands in order to reap profit from 
agricultural investments (Hall, 2013). 
 
Interest by International Donor Institutions 
 
This set of cases relates to land policy reforms and services financed through official 
development assistance (ODA). Since the 1990s, bilateral donors and IFIs have been active 
in land policy reforms, sometimes as conditionality for loans. Many of the types of land 
policies these actors promote, and in some cases are directly involved in, have been found 
to have negative impacts in the enjoyment of the human right to land of the local 
population. The United Sates, for instance, makes a developing country eligible for the 
benefits of its Millennium Challenge Account (MCA) and African Growth and Opportunity 
Act (AGOA) conditional on the implementation of free market reforms, including 
investment liberation (also see Hall, 2013). 
 
International Institutions for Investment Protection 
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The last set of cases relate to the international regime for investment protection. To 
encourage foreign direct investments and protect investors, an array of investment and 
trade agreements (collectively known as the international investment protection regime) 
have proliferated in the past 20 years. Such agreements aim at protecting foreign investors 
(both corporations and individuals) from arbitrary treatment by the host government, such 
as expropriation or nationalization of investments (Hall, 2013). Künnemann and Suárez 
(2013) conclude that cases of land grabbing evolve around land acquisition for mining and 
agricultural activities, infrastructural, investment opportunities and protection of 
international investments in natural resources. 
 
Anseeuw (2013) reveals an investment in agriculture has dominated large-scale land 
acquisition in recent times. Using Land Matrix (2011) as the basis of his argument, 
Anseeuw asserted that agricultural investment constitutes 69 percent of reported land deals 
with food crops accounting for 31 percent of the number of announced projects, biofuels 
29 percent, other non-food crops 6 percent and livestock 3 percent. He concludes that 
agricultural production is indeed the primary driver behind the rush for land in recent times. 
He further reveals that 31 percent represents land deals involving mining, tourism and other 
purposes for which land will be grabbed from small-scale holders (Anseeuw, 2013). 
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Figure 3.1: Cases of Reported Land Investments  
 
 
Source: Modified from Land Matrix, 2011 
  
However, Hall (2011) in his comparative studies in Southeast Asia on crop booms reveals 
that land grabbing not only involves foreign companies and foreign and domestic states as 
available literature present in the five set of cases. He further indicates that it is not just 
large domestic capital but it is also smallholders who have tried to take or keep control 
over land on which to grow boom crops. According to him, smallholder-driven crop booms 
often involve, at the micro-level, processes that are surprisingly similar to those that 
characterize the land grab at the level of tens or hundreds of thousands of hectares. He 
suggests that attention should be paid to smallholders as potential actors and agents of land 
grabbing. This demonstrates the complex patterns of actors who potentially facilitate land 
grabbing, depending on one’s definition and conceptualization of what constitutes land 
grabbing.  
 
Number of Verified Land Deals
Food
Biofuel
Non-food crop
Livestock
Others-Mining, Tourism
and other reasons
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There are still debates on whether such deals actually benefit the Global South in terms of 
the dichotomy of outcomes ranging from investment of opportunities to depriving them of 
their resources and means of livelihood (McMichael, 2013; Robertson and Pinstrup-
Andersen, 2010).  The next section, therefore, intends to assess causes and effects of land 
deals in the Global South. 
 
3.4 Actors, Institutional Frameworks and Motives (Interest) in Contemporary Land 
Deals 
 
 
The general perception among proponents of land deals is that most of the land available 
for buyers in the Global South is abundant and underutilized. Recent literature has focused 
on foreign private companies and foreign governments/organizations as key drivers to land 
grabbing in the Global South with either little or no emphasis on the roles played by the 
central states (Borras et al., 2012). It is, therefore, imperative that causes of land grabbing 
take into consideration roles played by states (Hall, 2013; Borras et al., 2012); international 
organizations (Hall, 2013); and foreign investments, which is also often referred to as 
‘foreignization’ of land (Zoomers, 2010; World Bank, 2010; Cotula, 2009). 
 
Borras et al. (2012) reveals that recipient states play critical roles in promoting national 
land grabbing, particularly in Latin America and the Caribbean. According to them, all 
states are engaged in systematic policy and administrative initiatives concerning land 
administrations. They further added that roles played by states include 
invention/justification; definition, reclassification and quantification; and acquisition and 
re-allocation/disposition of these lands. States also, for the purpose of legitimacy and 
administration, often create land records and titles classifying lands as either formally 
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privatized or state owned. This has resulted in the notion of available marginal, empty or 
unused lands since most indigenous settlers in the Global South have no formal titles to 
their lands (Hall, 2013; Seo and Rodriguez, 2012; Liversage, 2010). The roles played by 
states are therefore murky, since most states believe that taking a state’s land cannot be 
described as “grabbing.” This makes efforts at establish global governance over land 
grabbing quite complicated and difficult to frame, implement and enforce (Boras et al., 
2012). Table 3.1 provides a summary of the actors/stakeholders involved in land grabbing 
and their varied interests. The table demonstrates the interplay of actors and interests in the 
issue of land grabbing in the Global South. The table describes the interest or roles played 
by the various actors who are involved in land grabbing. It also shows the influence of such 
actors in enhancing land grabbing, which may be positive, negative or both. Positive and 
negative in this context are not meant normatively. Positive influence means that their roles 
or interest can promote land grabbing. The negative influence on the other hand describes 
such roles having no impact on promoting land grabbing. 
 
Table 3.1 Actors/Stakeholders in Land Grabbing 
Actors Interests/Roles Influence on Land 
Grabbing 
Domestic States Land policies, FDIs, Personal/economic 
benefits 
Positive (+) 
Foreign States food production for security, biofuel 
production, Investments 
Positive/Negative 
(±) 
Domestic Investors Investments (mining, real estates, 
agriculture) 
Positive/Negative 
(±) 
Foreign Investors Investments (mining, real estates, 
agriculture) 
Positive/Negative 
(±) 
International 
Organizations 
Food production, land policies, provision 
of risk insurance 
Positive/Negative 
(±) 
Grabbees (Peasants, 
indigenous communities 
etc.). 
Protection land, livelihoods and cultural 
values 
Negative (-) 
Source: Author, Construct, 2016 (Modified from the literature) 
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States’ role in land grabbing is driven, in some situations, by the personal or economic 
benefits received by the politicians or the bureaucrats with the power to facilitate such deals 
(Hall, 2013). State officials, therefore, influence land grabbing by helping investors 
navigate their regulatory and practical challenges.  Foreign land deals are also facilitated 
by recipient countries through favorable land and trade policies (Messerli et al., 2013). 
Such deals have been institutionalized by weak regulatory frameworks/land governance or 
corrupt and non-transparent/shady deals in countries where such structures have been put 
in place (Woodhouse, 2012; Liversage, 2010). Typical examples include the (reversed) 
South Korean Daewoo case in Madagascar and the Malibya case in Mali. GRAIN et al. 
(2014) therefore concluded that land grabbing is most rampant in countries where corrupt 
and unaccountable decision-making exists, combined with poverty and powerlessness such 
as is prevalent in countries found in the South. 
 
The most recognized form of land grabbing in the literature in recent times involves foreign 
investments by either transnational institutions or foreign states. This involves 
transnational companies or states who are seeking to secure access to land in developing 
countries for agricultural (food and biofuel production) and non-agricultural purposes 
(Messerli et al., 2013, Hall, 2013). Both food and nonfood crops are important targets of 
investment, but ‘flex crops’ that can be used for both food and biofuels (such as soybean, 
sugarcane, and oil palm) are also considered important (Borras, et al., 2012).  
 
Wealthy but food-insecure countries worried about tightening markets are seeking to 
enhance their food production by leasing and buying land overseas. Such countries, as a 
strategy to deal with the future food security issues, tend to invest in land deals overseas, 
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and particularly in the sub-Saharan African countries, purposely for food production to 
meet their domestic demand at cheaper prices (Edelman et al., 2013; Brown, 2011). 
According to the FAO (2009), most of the countries that are currently food-self-sufficient 
are in Asia (e.g., includes China and India). Cotula (2011) and GRAIN (2008) also find 
that food import-dependent countries, particularly Saudi Arabia, Japan and South Korea, 
are in search for fertile farmlands in countries in the Global South including Uganda, 
Madagascar, Mali, Somalia, Sudan, Mozambique, Philippines, Indonesia, Laos, Thailand, 
Vietnam, Cambodia, Pakistan, Burma, etc. Some of these recipient countries do welcome 
investors for land deals even though such countries (including Madagascar, Sudan, and 
Cambodia) are food-insufficient (Burley & Bebb, 2010; Zoomers, 2010). 
 
In addition to gaining control over food production, various actors are interested controlling 
land to control energy production and wealth generation. The growing interest in land 
investments in green energy, including biofuels, is as a result of global awareness of 
anthropogenic climate change. Countries have therefore set targets to replace its fuel needs 
with agrofuel. For instance, the United States, as the largest consumer of oil, has set a target 
of 30 percent by 2030 while the EU directive stipulates that 10 percent of transport fuels 
must be supplied from ‘renewable’ sources by 2020 with the expectation that 80–90 percent 
of this target will be met from biofuels (Anseeuw et al., 2011). A survey of countries which 
have enacted legislations to promote biofuel revealed that 40 out of 50 countries have 
actually enacted legislations to promoted biofuel, signifying the increasing need for biofuel 
production (Smith 2010). The International Energy Agency (2011) has predicted global 
agrofuel consumption to reach 250 billion liters of gasoline equivalent per year by 2030.  
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Currently, land deals for biofuel production are dominant in countries such as Madagascar 
and Ethiopia, where jatropha, palm oil, and sugar are major crops. EU countries have 
already secured or requested five million hectares of land for industrial biofuels in 
developing countries (ActionAid, 2010). 
 
Many researchers and environmentalists see these land investments in green energy 
production as a strategy for the private sector to take advantage of the emerging market of 
green energy. This has resulted in land competition for food and energy production with 
the major effects on global food production (Seo and Rodriguez, 2012). This has also 
resulted in financial capital being lured into land grabbing by a combination of the low cost 
of land, rising food prices and massive speculation in biofuels. Foreign investors see land 
and land-based resources as a means of shifting their capital to more ‘stable’ commodity 
sectors with the belief that land purchased in today’s market will appreciate in the future 
and will provide the investor with a stable asset to balance the more volatile components 
of their overall portfolio (Daniel and Aittal, 2009; Smaller and Mann, 2009). 
 
Governments in rich countries and international organizations such as International 
Financial Institutions (IFI) play key roles in facilitating foreign investments in global land 
grabbing (Hall, 2013). This happens through direct and indirect assistance to foreign firms 
seeking to invest in land deals in the Global South. Such direct assistance according to Hall 
includes investment in such firms and provision of risk insurance against potential and 
unforeseeable problems such as expropriation, breach of contract and civil war. Foreign 
powerful nations and agencies encourage and pressure countries in the South to open 
themselves up for foreign land investment as some of the major indirect assistance provided 
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to facilitate land deals in the Global South. This takes the form of a conditional assistance 
being given to countries in the South. For instance, the World Bank Group uses methods 
such as policy advice on liberalization investment and land access policies; technical 
assistance in the actual drafting of laws and regulations; maintaining indicators of 
investment-friendliness countries and providing help (including policy advice and funding) 
to get Global South states to open up to land investment for countries creating or expanding 
investment promotion agencies (Hall 2013). 
 
Current inventories of large-scale land acquisitions at the national, regional, and 
international levels largely rely on reports by the media or by nongovernmental 
organizations and advocacy groups (Messerli et al., 2013). While estimates of the scope of 
this phenomenon suggest that it is happening on a very large scale (World Bank, 2010; 
Grain, 2008), such estimates must be treated with caution. Several flaws were evident in 
much of the initial estimates from 2007 to 2012. Land grab research is complicated by the 
sparseness and unreliability of data (Hall, 2011).  Research into land grabbing disconnects 
between some conclusions on outcomes or impacts and available evidence, and between 
declared research purposes and adopted research methodologies (Edelman et al., 2013). 
This has made it difficult to have an overall estimate in terms of global land grabs. It 
currently ranges between 51 and 83 million hectares depending on sources, data quality, 
and definitions used (Cotula, 2012; Anseeuw et al., 2012). Significantly for the purposes 
of this thesis, 66 percent of all land grabs are in sub-Saharan Africa, although sizeable 
acquisitions have also been agreed in Latin America, the Ukraine, Southern Russia, 
Southeast Asia and Australia (Oxfam, 2012). 
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Land grabbing is a major issue of concern that goes beyond foreign land acquisitions. 
While it is important to focus on the potential negative effects of foreign land acquisitions 
on land rights and livelihoods of small-holder farmers, pastoralists, indigenous 
communities and other vulnerable groups, much attention should also be focused on the 
role being played by domestic elites and weaknesses in national land administration 
systems (Liversage, 2010). More significant according to Liversage, land grabbing in some 
countries is done by national and local elites and competing land users (for example, 
pastoralists and crop farmers). Other forms that exist include land grabs within families, 
typically men from women and sometimes from widows and orphans. Thus, focusing only 
on large-scale land acquisitions by foreigners can divert attention from more serious land 
grabbing in some societies and called for a response to land grabbing that looks more 
broadly at strengthening transparent, accountable and accessible land administration 
institutions that protect the rights of vulnerable people against all land grabs (Liversage, 
2010).  
 
3.5 Effects of Land Grabbing in the Global South 
 
Debates about the effects of land grabbing have been characterized by ideological 
divisions. Whereas some see it as bringing agricultural investment and development 
opportunity to vulnerable actors in the Global South (Collier, 2008; Sender and Johnston, 
2004), others believe that land grabbing results in the alienation of peasants from the land 
and the entrenchment of industrialized forms of farming that do little to reduce poverty, 
promote food security or protect the environment (Hall, 2013; Messerli et al., 2013; 
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McMichael, 2012; Robertson and Pinstrup-Andersen, 2010). Yet despite these divergent 
positions, a consensus has arisen on the need to revisit, as researchers, the types of grabbing 
and how they affect the interests and livelihoods of the small-scale holders in different 
ways (Cotula et al., 2009; World Bank, 2011).  
 
Liversage (2010) believes that in general, there is still insufficient information on the 
impacts that realized land deals have had on the livelihoods of rural communities in the 
affected countries – either negative or positive. Many land deals contain certain premises 
of benefits including employment, income, technology and financial transfer but despite 
these possible positive benefits, there is scant evidence as to whether these have been 
fulfilled or not. Liversage waded into the debates with the assertion that while some 
literature suggests that at least some large-scale acquisitions have not met expectations and, 
instead, have had a negative impact, others (Collier, 2008; Sender and Johnston, 2004) 
argue some of the large-scale foreign investment in agriculture are having a positive 
impact. Liversage, therefore, proposes that more well-documented research on effects, both 
positive and negative, is needed. This means that land grabbing does not only constitute 
negative effects as some literature suggests but has certain positive sides that benefit the 
recipient states or the affected people. This section analyzes the debates surrounding the 
effects of land grabbing. It assesses the definition of both positive and negative effects of 
land grabbing and conditions under which the effects are considered negative. 
 
Those who argue in favor of large-scale land deals (including Collier, 2008; Sender and 
Johnston, 2004; World Bank, 2008) argue that such investments hold the promise of 
substantial benefits to the local people and the environment. Such arguments are always 
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based on the assertion that arable lands in the South remain ‘under-utilized’ or ‘unused’ 
which could be efficiently utilized not to only benefit the local people but to improve future 
global food security. None of the African countries of most interest to investors’, according 
to a report by the World Bank, are now achieving more than 30 percent of the potential 
yield on currently cultivated areas (Deininger et al.,2011; LI, 2011). The World Bank is 
calling for the need to make ‘good’ use of such arable lands. The arguments further noted 
that the poverty of the huge numbers of people who farm on ‘under-utilized’ land is both 
as a result and cause of the ‘yield gap’ between current yields per hectare and those that 
will be achieved if the best existing practices were used. The Global Harvest Initiative 
(GHI) embraces the same ‘yield gap’ arguments and in their argument presented the global 
yield gap in a graphical form (as Shown in Figure 3.2). GHI’s GAP Index quantified the 
difference between the present rate of agricultural productivity and the pace required to 
meet future needs. Their argument is replete with ‘hard facts’ (as shown in the graph) that 
makes a convincing case for more large-scale commercial farming to increase global food 
supply to meet the projected global population of nine billion people by 2030 (Nally, 2014). 
This initiative calls for small-scale inefficient farmers to abandon their lands for large-scale 
efficient ones and take wage employment to boost food production. 
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Figure 3.2: Visualizing the Yield Gap 
Source: GHI, 2010 
 
 Large-scale agricultural (both domestic and international) investments, the argument goes, 
hold out the promise of ameliorating this situation by bringing together corporate capital, 
technology, managerial know-how, infrastructure and distribution networks with the 
under-capitalized agricultural land and labour to the South (Hall, 2013). Large-scale 
investments, therefore, play a significant role in supporting economic growth both in 
developed and developing countries. For supporters, they have the potential to increase the 
amount of capital in the host economy, raise labour productivity, income, and employment, 
with mostly positive impacts in terms of economic development (OECD, 2002). 
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Large-scale land acquisition is presented in a specific way from the perspectives of those 
in favor of such deals. However, proponents sometimes admit that such deals may go 
wrong and suggest that land deals should be transparent, respecting the rights of the holders 
and making information accessible when the need arises. Proponents also mention the 
importance of strengthening government frameworks (Akram-Lodhi, 2008). They believe 
that large-scale land investments in the South, when done right, benefits not just investors 
but host governments, landholders and communities, and can contribute, ultimately, to the 
goal of feeding the world (Hall, 2013). 
 
However, opponents of land grabbing have a different argument. Their first argument 
stems from the assertion that there is nothing like ‘unused’ arable land as proponents make 
us believe. They argue that supposedly ‘unused’ or ‘vacant’ lands are in fact often full of 
farmers at the time that the recipient states are negotiating with investors (Borras et al., 
2011; Liversage, 2010; Seo and Rodriguez, 2012; von Braun, Meinzen-Dick, 2009). For 
instance, in the Philippines, a large tract of land was allocated for large-scale investment 
on the basis that such land was ‘unused’ but a report by Borras et al. (2012) reveals that 
land was significantly populated and being used for productive agriculture.  For this reason, 
opponents further argue that the fact that land is not being currently farmed does not mean 
such lands are ‘unused’ or ‘vacant’. Such lands are usually used for some purpose, 
including fallow for swidden agriculture, grazing land for cattle, a source of wood and 
other forest products. Critics, therefore, believe that global land grabbing essentially 
involves the seizure of land from small-scale holders in the South who do not have secure 
property rights or the required political power to resist such seizure. They believe that land 
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grabbing takes place in areas where lands could be taken without too much difficulty (Hall, 
2013, 2011; World Bank, 2010).  
 
Attempts by state and corporate actors to seize control of large tracts of land while denying 
the claims of the people living on that land have been met with highly contentious and 
visible struggles (Hall, 2011). In some cases, coercion and violence have accompanied the 
state’s effort promoting large-scale private investment in land deals, as in the case of 
present Colombia (Grajales, 2011) and in many countries in Latin America and the 
Caribbean during recent decades (Kay, 2001). Land grabbing, according to the critics, also 
has negative consequences on human rights, food security, climate change, and 
employment and income. 
 
Using Mozambique as a case study, Künnemann and Suárez (2013:113-114) highlight the 
effects of land grabbing on human rights. According to the authors, around 35 percent of 
Mozambican households are chronically food insecure and 46 percent of all children below 
five years are malnourished. 80 percent of the population lives in rural areas and depends 
on subsistence agriculture and the use of natural resources for their livelihoods. The 
government of Mozambique, in an attempt to boost development, has nevertheless been 
promoting large-scale land investment with a target of 1.3 million hectares in the next 20 
years in the country. This has resulted in the allocation of about 55,000 ha of land to six 
companies for plantations, creating significant negative effects for local peoples 
(Künnemann and Suárez 2013). 
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This land allocation in Mozambique has translated to most peasants losing access to their 
farmlands previously used for food production. This has resulted in loss of livelihood by 
these peasants who heavily rely on farming as their main source of livelihood. In addition 
to the issues of farmland loss, local people have also lost access to native forests including 
forest product for medicinal purposes, home construction, and energy, as well as an 
additional source of income. Although such lands were taken with a condition to provide 
jobs as alternative sources of livelihood, the authors reveal few jobs have been created and 
most of the jobs are temporary in nature and poorly paid. These jobs in no way compensate 
the local people for their loss of land and forest. The authors further reiterated that given 
an experience from somewhere, the projects for which those lands in the country were 
acquired will lead to water shortage and negative environmental impacts, including water 
contamination, destruction of ecosystems to loss of biodiversity and soil degradation 
Künnemann and Suárez (2013). 
 
Künnemann and Suárez believe that the large-scale land acquisition for plantation purposes 
from these peasant farmers have considerable impacts on the fundamental human rights of 
these landholders. According to them, loss of access to land for food production and water 
amounts to infringement of their rights to food and water. They believe that since a 
relatively small part of the areas dedicated to tree plantations are in operation so far, the 
human rights impacts are likely to increase during the coming years as these projects scale 
upwards (Künnemann and Suárez 2013).  Seo and Rodriguez (2012) and GRAINS et al. 
(2014) added that in developing countries, land deals, in most cases, result in displacement, 
dispossession, and disenfranchisement of local communities and rural poor in the South 
53 
 
which affect their basic rights to the shelter without proper compensation. Furthermore, 
women who constitute about 70 percent of farmers in developing countries are the most 
vulnerable to the land grab and resulting human rights abuses as they may not be able to 
protect their own land tenure claims in court due to local laws. 
 
Large-scale land deals also lead to local food insecurity, specifically in terms of 
availability, access, and utilization of food. This is because locally produced agricultural 
products are mainly exported by investors, which compel farmers to purchase agricultural 
goods for trade to elsewhere as opposed to benefiting from the harvest of their own lands 
(GRAINS, 2008; Seo and Rodriguez, 2012). Land grabbing involves ‘exporting food 
insecurity’ because they are about producing food for export markets, creating food 
insecurity for the producers (GRAINS et al., 2014). Land grabbing is about answering 
some peoples’ needs for food and biofuel by taking food from others. The global land grab 
is thus worsening food security with or without ‘principles’ and ‘guidelines’. It pushes an 
agriculture based on large-scale monocultures, chemicals, fossil fuels, and slave-like 
labour with the primary aim of making a profit and not to boost food security. For example, 
Ethiopia since 1984 has been known for food shortages due to large-scale land deals 
(GRAINS et al., 2014). The detrimental effects of these land deals were evident during the 
2008 famine in which food instability levels increased among the population while the food 
was being exported. This food shortage resulted in the Ethiopian government seeking for 
external food aid in 2010 and 2011 (Dominguez, 2011).  
 
Although there has been an assurance by the government in Ethiopia to boost food 
production within the next few years, this came at a time when the government was still 
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closing land deals with private investors (about 10% of entire agricultural are to foreign 
investors) at the expense of the citizens (Cochrane, 2011; GRAIN, 2008). Such practices 
were heavily criticized by institutions including the USAID. The USAID, in particular, 
argues that the key measure to boost food production in Ethiopia is by guaranteeing the 
complete ownership of land by its citizens and to stimulate local consumption (USAID 
Ethiopia, 2010 cited in Seo and Rodriguez, 2012). Despite these policy suggestions, the 
country continues to simultaneously rely on food aid and practice large-scale land deals for 
food production purposely for export. 
 
GRAINS et al. (2014) point out that there are many examples of how people who just want 
to grow food and make a living from the land are being expelled, criminalized, and 
sometimes killed, to make room for the production of food and biomass to the benefit of 
someone else's wealth. GRAINS et al. conceded that local landholders sometimes easily 
opt out for lands with good deals in infrastructure and services provision. However, they 
maintained that whatever be the reason, one cannot run away from the fact that a number 
of cases have been put on record where the process of displacement ranges from coercion 
to forced eviction and killings. Their assertion was buttressed with a statement that hardly 
a day goes by without media reports of the assassination of an environmentalist or peasant 
in the struggle over land conflicts particularly in countries such as China, Peru, Indiana, 
and Brazil. GRAINS et al. concluded that land grabbing has succeeded in turning farmers 
and landholders into refugees in their own lands.  
 
Hall (2013) highlights other problems of land grabbing beyond dispossession. These 
include limited job-creation prospects due to plantation style (e.g. one foreign-owned farm 
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in the cerrado has 40,000 ha of land with just 180 workers); exportation of foods produced 
from the practices creating food insecurity situation in the recipient countries; competition 
of water between local peasant farmers and large-scale investors; and social and 
environmental damage often associated with large-scale land investment. Apart from the 
human rights implications for those that are already living on the brink of hunger, land 
grabbing potentially also has tremendous environmental implications: soil erosion, water 
depletion, increased pesticides use, more emissions of climate change gasses, and the loss 
of biodiversity. Large-scale land investments provide an easy entry and permanent control 
(through sale or long-term leases) of large vast of lands in return for minimal payments or 
sometimes nothing in return (Hall, 2013; 2011). 
 
Critics of land grabbing believe that the win-win approach to global land grabbing to solve 
food and energy crises is not realistic as large-scale investments, irrespective of the 
purposes for which such lands are acquired, have negative implications that outweigh their 
benefits.  For instance, according to GRAIN et al. (2014), the win-win proponents mention 
transparent and good governance involving respecting the rights of local communities 
when indeed evidence shows something contradictory by their own governments. GRAIN 
et al. further argue that the win-win proponents are not even certain on how such practices 
could be handled to cater to food security challenges in recipients’ countries, making a 
strong case against large-scale land investments, particularly by foreigners. 
 
3.6 Political Economy Framework for Land Grabbing 
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It is clear from the literature that key debates in political economy involving land grabbing 
focuses on actors and institutions, their interests and the effects of the phenomenon.  These 
are discussed in this section using the conceptual framework as shown in Figure 3.3. 
 
Even though there is no accurate figure concerning precisely how much land that have been 
grabbed in the South, there is no question that a rapidly growing amount have been grabbed 
either domestically or by foreign investors in the last decade (Borras et al., 2012; GRAIN 
et al., 2014; Liversage; 2010; Seo and Rodrguez, 2012). Most of these lands are found in 
rural areas where such lands are occupied by indigenous or rural poor people whose lives 
and livelihoods depend on those lands. Evidence in the literature reveals that there are 
numerous foreign land investments involving agriculture, mining, and real estate 
development. This implies that irrespective of the debates involving how much lands are 
being grabbed and for which specific purposes, three things are in common in the 
phenomenon of land grabbing in these recent times: 1) evidence of large-scale land 
acquisitions (either domestically or by foreign investors); 2) evidence of most of such 
acquisitions occurring on productive agriculture lands; and 3) evidence of the use of such 
lands for the purpose for which it was grabbed.  
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Figure 3.3: Political Economy Analytical Framework for Land Grabbing 
 
 
 
   
 
  
 
  
  
 
    
  
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
Source: Author’s Construct, 2016 (Conceived from literature)  
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It is also clear from the literature that land grabbing involves a variety actor, some more 
powerful, active, common and influential than others. Most basically, the actors can be 
classified into two main categories namely, ‘grabbers’ and ‘grabbees’. The ‘grabbers’ 
involve governments (in both foreign and recipient states), including ministries, state-
owned enterprises, sovereign wealth funds and government institutions (Sindayigaya, 
2011). Another important component of the grabbers is that private investors are very 
prevalent. Both domestic and foreign investors have been identified as significant agents 
of land grabbing, though land grabbing patterns are often dominated by the latter. These 
private investors include banks, investment houses, private equity, pension and hedge 
funds.  
 
The ‘grabbees’ constitute those who are at the receiving end of the practice of large-scale 
land investments. These include weak states, small-holder or peasant farmers, and local or 
indigenous communities who are mostly rural poor who depend on their lands as their basic 
means of livelihood. This draws attention to the problem of the most powerful actors 
(grabbers) exploiting weaker actors (grabbees), making the fight against the negative 
effects of land grabbing a difficult one. In addition, land grabbing also typically involves 
the weakest, mostly people without proper legitimate titles to their lands, fighting against 
powerful people with legal and other institutional machinery advantages to serve their 
interests. 
 
These actors do not just engage themselves in the practice of land grabbing as there are 
interests that are associated with their involvement in land grabbing. This has been 
categorized into pull and push factors. The pull factors involve what attracts (on the basis 
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of factors in the recipient countries) particularly foreign land investments and include the 
call for foreign investment by recipient countries, weak landholders, and corrupt leaders 
and politicians in most recipient countries in the South. The push factors, on the other hand, 
involve the driving force for land investment from the perspective of grabbers. These 
include the perception of ‘unused’ or ‘vacant’ productive lands in the South; the recent 
need for increased food and biofuel production; the recent boom in land investments; direct 
assistance from foreign institutions; and the promises and expectations of a significant 
return on investment (profit).  
 
Another important debate that surrounds the concept of land grabbing involves the effects 
of the phenomenon. This chapter has identified conflicting evidence on whether land 
grabbing benefits ‘grabbees’ and their countries positively or negatively. Land grabbing 
has both positive and negative effects within specific contexts, with evidence to buttress 
both claims. Overall, however, the body of evidence suggests that land grabbing remains a 
very problematic phenomenon with largely negative consequences in the Global South. It 
is within the concept of these debates that there will continue to be the development of new 
policies and reformulation of existing policies aimed at ensuring that land management, 
policy, and administration benefits those who are marginalized and vulnerable. 
 
3.7 Political Ecology of Land Grabbing  
 
This section looks at the interrelated social and environmental changes that have occurred 
as a result of land grabbing. The discussion focuses on evidence of how people have been 
marginalized by land grabbing and how the phenomenon has degraded land as a resource. 
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The political ecology of land grabbing also sheds light on how land is controlled and 
resource conflict associated with land grabbing. 
 
3.7.1 Marginalization and Degradation in Land Grabbing. 
 
Marginalization occurs when specific groups of people are relegated to the lower or outer 
edge of society. Land grabbing often pushes people to the margin of society economically, 
politically, culturally and socially following the policy of exclusion associated with it. Most 
importantly, land grabbing denies small-scale holders, peasants and indigenous 
communities access to productive land resources (GRAIN et al., 2014; Hall, 2013; Borras 
et al., 2012). 
 
Economically, many marginalized groups of people have lost their farm land, which serves 
as their main source of livelihood in terms of employment, income and food to feed 
themselves and that of their families (Hall, 2013; GRAIN, 2008). In those sitautions, lands 
that were previously relied upon by farmers for food production have been converted either 
for producing food for exports at the expense of previous landholders or for other activities 
outside food production (Seo and Rodriguez, 2012; Borras et al., 2012). This has had the 
tendency of increasing food insecurities for people and communities that have had their 
lands taken away from them. Land grabbing is therefore largely about satisfying the needs 
of some by denying others access to food, hence, relegating those whose lands have been 
taken to the background. Mozambique and Ethiopia are notable examples of countries 
where marginalized peoples have had their food production affected by land grabbing 
(Künnemann and Suárez, 2013). 
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Socially, people are also marginalized when they lose their main source of habitat. This 
happens when people are dispossessed from their lands due to land grabbing and therefore 
end up losing their place of habitat (GRAINS et al., 2014; Hall, 2013; 2011; GRAINS, 
2008).  Land grabbing cases in the Global South have resulted in dispossession and 
displacement of prior landholders (Borras et al., 2012). There have even been cases where 
people were not adequately compensated when they lost accees to their place of abode, 
further illustrating how people have been marginalized due to land grabbing. Landholders 
do not only lose their social way of life but also the cultural aspect of their lives ((GRAINS 
et al., 2014). 
 
The result is that those affected by the prevalent menacing side of land grabbing have been 
subjected to poverty, misery, low or no wages, and livelihood and food insecurity. This 
process of relegation associated with land grabbing denies people equal access to formal 
power structure and participation in the decision-making processes, leading to their 
subordination to and dependence on the economically and politically dominant groups of 
society (GRAIN et al., 2014; Hall, 2013; Künnemann and Suárez, 2013; Grajales, 2011) 
Land degradation, on the other hand, involves the deterioration in the quality of land, its 
topsoil, vegetation, and/or water resources caused usually by excessive or inappropriate 
exploitation. Large-scale land investment does not necessarily have a direct relationship 
with land degradation. This means that land grabbing does not necessarily mean that the 
lands involved will be subjected to degradation. However, evidence reveals that land 
grabbing has resulted in environmental degradation (Hall, 2013). Environmental issues 
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such as soil erosion, water depletion, the loss of biodiversity and subjecting lands to 
harmful chemicals, have been associated with land grabbing.  
The marginalization of prior landholders and the degradation of land have the potential of 
making the places subjected to land grabbing unsustainable. Thus, land grabbing makes 
grabbees politically, economically, socially and culturally vulnerable, a situation which 
does not give them the full capacity to sustain themselves in the present. Besides, what will 
be left for the future generation if the current land resources are subjected to degradation? 
 
3.7.2 Conservation and Control in Land Grabbing 
 
Land conservation attempts to combat land degradation through preservation, restoration, 
remediation, and mitigation. It is not just about returning a degraded land to its previous 
state but also about protecting lands from over-exploitation with the aim of achieving 
ecological and social sustainability. Land conservation in an ideal situation should meet 
the interests of environmental protection and not that of bureaucrats or investors. However, 
land grabbing subjects lands to degradation rather than conservation. Which category of 
people suffers from land grabbing made in the name of conservation? Are the rich and 
powerful in society the only beneficiaries? Are there issues of class, gender, and ethnicity 
in grabbing? The answers to these questions are what constitute conservation and control 
thesis in political ecology of land grabbing. 
 
Land grabbing has manifested in environmental protection discourses and practices 
mechanisms, which aim at protecting nature for ‘green’ purposes of biodiversity 
conservation. These mechanisms justify and even legitimate the dispossession of local 
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community members, including indigenous people and peasants. A typical instance 
involves the conservation of Tayrona National Natural Park in Columbia, which resulted 
in the grabbing of resources from prior users. Such conservation was done in the name of 
tourism development entrusted to a private entity by the state with significant effects on 
local community members’ livelihood strategies. The result was the criminalization, 
relocation and expulsion of workers and park residents who not only lost the source of their 
livelihoods but also their place of abode (Ojeda, 2012: 363-365). 
 
3.7.3 Conflict and Exclusion in Land Grabbing 
 
Land conflicts manifest themselves as political, social, economic, ethnic, religious or 
territorial conflicts, or conflicts over land as a resource. They are traditional conflicts 
induced by exclusion from land and land degradation (Libiszewski, 1991). Environmental 
conflict often results from the exclusion of grabbees from land resources and land 
degradation association with land grabbing. The effects of land grabbing that result in 
conflicts include a decrease in food and generally, agricultural production, general 
economic decline, population displacements, and disruption of cultural activities and social 
relations (Hall, 2011).  
 
There have been several cases of land grabbing in the Global South that have resulted in 
bloody clashes between grabbees and grabbers. Since land grabbing often involves 
exclusion of grabbees from their habitats and the main source of livelihoods, the thesis of 
control of resources is manifested and eventually results in the marginalization of grabbees 
and land degradation. There have been cases of coercion and violence accompanied by 
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states’ efforts to promote large-scale private investment in land deals. People in attempts 
to protect their lands have been abused, a situation which has resulted in armed-conflicts 
in some of the cases of land grabbing in the Global South.  Insurgencies in the context of 
relative deprivation of lower-status groups from their lands are one particularly violent type 
of environmental conflicts associated with land grabbing (Hall, 2013; Grajales, 2011; Kay, 
2001). 
 
3.8 Summary of Chapter Three 
 
This chapter provides a comprehensive analysis of the issue of land grabbing. The political 
economy analysis reveals that land grabbing occurs through the interplay of actors, 
motives, and institutions. The chapter further demonstrates that the interests of actors are 
influenced by the ideological belief that large vast of ‘unused’ and underutilized lands exist 
in the Global South, weaknesses in land policies and regulatory institutions, the real and 
imagined imperatives to increase global food production and, more recently, a shift in the 
production and use of biofuel by most developed countries.  
 
Land grabbing was also revealed to occur under the disguise of conservation, which tends 
to control and dispossess lands from small-scale holders. The results are social 
marginalization, including dispossession, local food insecurity, and loss of employment 
and income. It also results in degradation of land and its resources and possible resource 
violence and conflicts. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
 
WATER GRABBING 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter focuses on water grabbing and builds on the previous chapter of land grabbing.  
The concept of water grabbing in the resource grabbing debates and reasons for which 
water may be grabbed are revealed in this chapter. The chapter also gives prominence to 
the relationship between land and water grabbing since both phenomena have been 
revealed to occur simultaneously. A political ecology and political economy analysis for 
water grabbing reveals these links with and the similarities between water grabbing and 
land grabbing. Since land and water grabbing sometimes occur simultaneously, the social 
economic structures, institutions, actors and interests that promote water grabbing are often 
similar to those promoting land grabbing.  
 
4.2 Water as a Political Object 
 
Water is essential for human survival and well-being and important to many sectors of the 
economy. The world contains an estimated 1400 million cubic km of water, which covers 
about three-quarters (70%) of Earth's surface (FAO, 2008). About 97.5 percent of the water 
coverage on earth is made up of sea water. Fresh water constitutes 2.5 percent of the figure 
with only 0.5 percent of the fresh water available for human use. This 0.5 percent of 
available freshwater exists in aquifers including rainfall, natural lakes, reservoirs and rivers 
(Fry, 2005). The world’s water exists naturally in different forms and locations including 
in the air, on the surface, below the ground, and in the oceans (Cosgrove, 2012).  
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Water, like other natural resources, is very important for economic growth and 
development. Freshwater availability and use, as well as the conservation of aquatic 
resources, are key to human well-being. Water resources serve as a catalyst for agricultural 
and industrial development in the areas of irrigation, hydro-electricity production and for 
domestic human use. Moreover, the food security across the world depends largely on 
water availability and thus water serves to reduce extreme poverty and hunger particularly 
in rural areas (FAO, 2008).  
 
Generally, developed nations in the North have more water resources than many countries 
in the South, particularly in Africa and the Middle East. However, some countries in the 
South with good water endowments are subject to "water stress" from developed countries 
for the purposes of agricultural and electric power production.  The expansion of 
agriculture, damming, diversion, overuse, and pollution threaten water resources in many 
parts of the world (Gleick & Ajami, 2014).  Agricultural production, for instance, accounts 
for about 70 percent of all water withdrawals and 95 percent in developing countries (FAO, 
2008), demonstrating the link between water and land resources.  
Water resources on earth, including rivers, lakes, oceans, and underground aquifers, are 
therefore under stress in many regions in the world. The continuous stress of water 
resources has cast doubt on the sustainability of the available fresh water in meeting future 
population increases (FAO, 2008). Human well-being and ecosystem health in many places 
are being seriously affected by the water stress, which has resulted in changes in the global 
water cycle (Gleick & Ajami, 2014).  International water policy is currently placing 
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emphasis on the need to improve governance as it relates to water resources management 
(WWAP, 2006). It is in this context that researchers and activists have identified water 
grabbing as a growing problem.    
 
4.3 Water Grabbing 
 
The contestation over and misuse of water is not new, but there is a renewed interest in a 
water perspective on resource grabs recently. Like land grabbing, instances of water 
grabbing appear to be resulting from a convergence of changing global dynamics around 
food, climate, energy and finance (Scoones et al., 2013). The persistent trend in population 
growth, changing climate, and a growing demand for water to satisfy the growing thirst of 
cities, suburbs, agriculture and industry have contributed to a more generalized interest in 
access to water and the environmental effects of growing water usage (Priscoli and Wolf, 
2009).  
 
Political economy and political ecology brings two general insights to the study of water 
grabbing. Firstly, these perspectives can help cast new light on the global land grab 
phenomenon itself and related issues of land governance. This means increasing attention 
to water has the potential to also bring land grabbing into the attention of policy-makers.  
Secondly, these perspectives open up new spaces for old questions of political control, 
social justice and environmental sustainability with regards to the use and management of 
water (Franco et al., 2013). 
 
Water grabbing, unlike land grabbing, has received little attention in terms of media 
debates and research. Yet water and land are interlinked resources (William et al., 2012; 
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Woodhouse, 2012; Franco et al., 2013).  Because water grabbing has not received 
significant attention, there are fewer debates concerning concept of water grabbing than 
there are about land grabbing. However, water grabbing as a phenomenon is infused with 
land grabbing. For Franco et al. (2012), water grabbing is described as the process by which 
powerful actors (states and investors) are able to take control of, or reallocate to their own 
benefit, water resources used by local communities or which feed aquatic ecosystems on 
which their livelihoods are based. In line with the definition proposed by Borras and Franco 
(2012) for land grabbing, Saso and Zwateveen (2012:362) define water grabbing “as 
involving both changes in water use, and (perhaps more importantly) also involving 
(irreversible) changes in water tenure relations”. According to Saso and Zwateveen, this 
process of water grabbing (just like land grabbing) involves the enclosure of commons by 
corporations and investors (both foreign and local) and government agencies, 
dispossession of peasants and indigenous people, and altering the environment. It also 
involves relocating agricultural and industrial water demands to foreign lands perceived to 
have abundant water resources. This means the investor is buying virtual-water directly 
instead of trading for products produced by that country (Zerrouk, 2013).  A key feature of 
this phenomenon is that underlying business deals are large scale, most visible in terms of 
land area and the capital involved. Water, unlike land, is not fixed and grabbing of such 
resources could also involve relocation, implying that the effect of such phenomenon goes 
beyond where the resource is located. 
 
 Water grabbing, by definition, also involves control of resources (water). Control over 
water establishes a strong relationship with land grabbing and also buttresses the argument 
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that land may be grabbed not for the land itself but for the resources found or around on 
the land. This control of water, like land, often occurs in countries that have weak 
institutional frameworks and where rights regimes over water and land are unclear 
(Zerrouk, 2013). The control in water grabbing, like land, is often not just about controlling 
the water itself, but is also about consolidating the power to decide how this resource will 
be used, by whom, when, for how long and for what purposes in order to control the 
benefits of use.  
 
Reminiscent of the ideas and discourses justifying land grabbing, water resources targeted 
for commercial use are often described as being 'unused' in order to legitimize the transfer 
of water into the hands of investors (Kay and Franco, 2012). The use of the term 'water 
grabbing' therefore emanated from the undue, unfair, and undemocratic manner of water 
control and transfers away from, as well as their disastrous effects on, the livelihoods of 
small cultivators and other sections of the rural population relying directly and indirectly 
on agriculture. These features are very similar to those identified in the analysis of land 
grabbing (Franco et al., 2014). 
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Figure 4.1: Land and Water Grabbing 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Author’s Construct, 2016 (Conceived from literature) 
 
Water can even be considered as ‘grabbed,’ in a broader sense, if it has been polluted 
beyond the point of being safely/easily used for the purposes it was put to previously. This 
means that if a development leads to water being non-potable, to it being unsuitable for 
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agriculture purposes, or even to the build-up of contaminants in an ecosystem, then this 
water has effectively been ‘removed’ from the cycle of use in that basin. For some, this 
result falls into the category of water grabbing (Franco et al., 2014). 
 
Water may be the context of a grab, it may be the object of a grab, or it may be both at the 
same time (Franco et al., 2013). Water in the context of land grabbing plays a crucial role 
in agriculture-driven land grabbing. It often determines lands which are desirable or most 
coveted by investors, with those having some irrigation potential as highly prized and 
valued. In other cases, water itself is the primary object of the grabbing, resulting in 
reallocations of formal and informal water rights and their benefits of use. This, for 
example, includes situations where water is needed for the generation of hydroelectric 
power. Indeed, the available literature reveals that water grabbing may be influenced by 
two main motives of grabbers—for agriculture production and for the purpose of the 
hydroelectric dam—even though other factors may be a strong influence for such grabbing 
(Wagle et al., 2012; Kay and Franco, 2012; Zerrouk, 2013). 
 
4.3.1 Interest of Grabbers in Water Acquisition for Agricultural Investment  
 
Water grabbing for agricultural purposes is often influenced by agricultural land 
investment and forms a major part of the recent debate on land grabbing for food and 
biofuel production. The way land is put to use has a major impact on both the quantity and 
quality of water resources. Water grabbing is both an important cause and effect of the 
large-scale land acquisition in the sense that land may be acquired not for its use but for 
investor interest in water resources. In recent years, various studies presented strong 
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evidence for understanding land grabbing for agriculture (for food, feed, fuel and raw 
material for industrial use) as having important water dimensions (Franco, et al., 2013; Kay 
and Franco, 2012, Woodhouse, 2012). This evidence in the literature is buttressed by the 
fact that sub-Saharan Africa experiences highly erratic rainfall rates, which makes it 
essential to secure access to a reliable source of water in land investment for agriculture.  
 
Indeed, securing access to water has been cited as one of the underlying causes for large-
scale acquisitions of land by states such as Gulf countries, where renewable water resources 
are acutely limited (Woertz et al., 2008) and by rapidly growing emerging economies, such 
as China and India, where local water scarcity is beginning to emerge (de Fraiture et al., 
2008). The options available in remedying this challenge include improving the efficiency 
of water use. Examples include improved irrigation, safe reuse of wastewater and investing 
in expanding supply methods (inter-basin transfers, desalination, etc.). However, evidence 
reveals that these options are very expensive, particularly in the short term, which makes 
it economically more efficient to invest in areas with vast and cheap agricultural lands 
coupled with available water resources to support large-scale irrigational agriculture (Mann 
and Smaller, 2010).  In some regions, there is no possibility of irrigation without access to 
water, and thus, land investors would face high risks in drought periods. Thus, water plays 
a central role in these land deals (Smaller and Mann, 2009; Woodhouse and Ganho, 2011). 
 
According to Franco et al., (2012), most agricultural production relies on rainwater that 
has infiltrated the soil (also known as green water) but evidence suggests that diverted 
water (also called blue water) is far more reliable for production than green water. From 
the perspective of investors, this has formed a strong justification on why ‘unused and 
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underutilized’ land and water resources should be tapped and exploited; the idea includes 
the promotion of a “blue revolution” in Africa and the rest of the Southern countries. Even 
when irrigational water is not a requisite for production, experience shows that additional 
water may be needed for crops to do well, particularly during water scarce periods 
signifying the need for water resources in large-scale land investment for agriculture 
production. For the production of agrofuels like maize, cassava, and sugar cane, water is 
essential and therefore on high demand. This is because an increase in the use of crops for 
fuel requires more water resources to be re-directed for their growth, processing and use. 
This has serious implications for land and water considering the 20 percent projection of 
global arable lands targeted be used for biofuel production by 2050 (White and Dasgupta, 
2010) 
 
 The availability of adequate moisture is, therefore, a fundamental requirement for 
agricultural production and the use of land for such purposes. Lands designated for 
agricultural purpose provide an exclusive right to 'green' water (rainfall and plant 
transpiration) but in many contexts, it also implies a demand on 'blue' water resources 
(rivers, lakes and aquifers) since agriculture typically accounts for 70-80 percent of such 
water pumped, stored or diverted in less industrialized economies such the Global South 
(UNDP, 2006). 
 
In Ethiopia for example, water plays an instrumental role in land grabbing. Agriculture in 
Ethiopia contributed to approximately 43 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) in 
2008/2009, 86 percent of foreign currency earnings, and 85 percent of rural employment 
(Bues and Theesfeld, 2012:269). Ethiopia, which has agriculture as the main source of 
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livelihood and the main pillar of the country’s economy, has now become a hot deal for 
large-scale foreign land investment (Bues and Theesfeld 2012; Cotula et al. 2009; 
Deininger and Byerlee 2011). The estimated total land under the foreign land investment 
for agriculture varies from 500,000 hectares (ha) between 2009 and 2010 to 2.3 million ha 
between 1991 and 2010. These agricultural land investments constitute 32 percent of the 
overall inflow of FDI to Ethiopia, with most of the investors coming from the European 
Union (EU), India, Israel, Saudi Arabia and the United States (US). Two factors make 
Ethiopia favorable for commercial investors in horticulture. First, only 30 percent of the 
country’s arable potential is presently under use for crop cultivation. Secondly, the 
abundance of arable lands, coupled with the availability of water resources on these lands, 
serves as pull factors for irrigational agriculture investment in Ethiopia (Bues and 
Theesfeld, 2012:269). The scale of investor interest in land and agriculture, therefore, 
increases the scale of potential water grabbing.  
 
It is clear that water scarcity plays an instrumental role (often serves as a pull factor) in the 
phenomenon of global land grabbing. This, Woodhouse (2012) notes, is not just because 
there is water scarcity globally; it is, rather, because of the local scarcity of water for 
agriculture production in emerging economies such in India and China and in countries 
where water renewal is non-existent, or is a challenge, such as in the Gulf countries. 
4.3.2 Interest of Water Acquisition for Hydroelectric Dams 
 
The preceding section revealed that agricultural land investment has an influence on water 
demand for agricultural projects. This implies that the increase in the phenomenon of land 
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grabbing for agricultural purposes will have a positive effect on interest in water and, 
therefore, will contribute significantly to water grabbing.  
 
Global climate change debates have identified hydroelectric power as a low-carbon 
alternative source of energy. The growth of the biofuel agro-industry has changed the 
dynamics of land use in producing countries while a resurgence in hydro-power 
development is buoyed by the world’s need for ‘green energy’ (Zerrouk, 2013).  Water 
grabbing for hydro-power production, unlike that of agriculture occurs mainly for the water 
resource and not for the surrounding land as a resource. In the case of hydropower 
development, water is the primary target of grabbing. 
 
The main motive behind water grabbing for hydropower production is to ensure a cheap, 
reliable and an alternative energy supply for local consumption and for exports (Zerrouk 
2013).  Also, lack of consultation with the general public or the consent of the locals in the 
construction areas dam projects often leads to water grabbing. The result is inequity, in 
terms of benefits sharing and compensation. These hydro-projects tend to have adverse 
effects on the affected communities instead of benefiting them. For instance, the planned 
hydropower projects on the upstream and downstream Salween River (in Southeast Asia) 
threatened delicate ecosystems and the livelihoods of millions, the majority of whom are 
from ethnic minority groups. This is because the river basin supports over 10 million people 
who belong to more than thirteen different ethnicities. The river is also known as a source 
of irrigation, fishing as well as other traditional activities and contains various important 
religious and cultural sites (Zerrouk 2013). 
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Water grabbing situations in some regions have resulted in armed conflicts in ethnic 
minority lands. The Salween River dams, for example, have often been characterized by 
violence and civil conflicts of the Eastern Border States. These projects, based on their 
locations, risk exacerbating the insecurities of the local population in terms of safety, 
livelihoods, water, and food, and jeopardize fragile ceasefire agreements. Another instance 
involves the internationally infamous Myitsone Dam project in Southeast Asia. This 
project led to the displacement of about 12,000 people. The project, which was suspended, 
escalated tensions between local armed resistance groups (e.g. the Kachin Independence 
Army) and the central government (Zerrouk, 2013). 
 
Beyond agriculture and energy, water grabbing extends into the water, climate and mineral 
domains in ways that highlight the distinct material character of water. Gold mines, for 
instance, require a large amount of water to 'wash' the soil containing gold minerals (Budds, 
2010). In addition, mining sites are often located in the catchment areas of water sources 
and rivers (Bebbington and Williams, 2008). This means that mining operations affect, and 
often alter, hydrological regimes and the quantity and quality of downstream water flows. 
Mines also contaminate water through leaching and dumping of tailings. This happens 
through chemical use and discharge during and after mining operations. 
 
Mining operations entail profound material modifications in water flows. In the case of 
mining in Cajamarca, Peru, the mining operations have impacted local communities in 
terms of appropriation of resources (land and water) compromising livelihoods and 
environments (Sosa and Zwateveen, 2012). Large mining operations in rural areas are also 
accompanied with profound and often irreversible changes in how water is controlled and 
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managed. These reconfigurations of waterscapes caused by mining operations can be 
understood as a form of water grabbing (Sosa and Zwateveen, 2012). Mining company 
strategies to acquire control over water in this case revealed that appropriation of water by 
the mining company happens through long-winding and often somewhat shady processes 
of negotiation and struggle between the company, the surrounding communities and 
different government agencies (Sosa and Zwateveen, 2012). These processes parallel cases 
in land grabbing and reinforce a core argument of this thesis that institutional factors can 
play an important role in facilitating resource grabbing.   
 
4.4 Summary of Chapter Four 
 
The chapter examined the emerging phenomenon of water grabbing, arguing that there is 
often a close relationship between land grabbing and water grabbing. Land and water 
grabbing occurs simultaneously in many situations in the sense that land may be grabbed 
for the purposes of water availability on that land and vice versa. The chapter also found 
that the interest of grabbers in water for agricultural purposes and for hydropower 
generation is the main cause of water grabbing situations. Water grabbing for agricultural 
purposes is meant to produce food cheaply for water-deficient countries. On the other hand, 
water grabbed for hydropower production is meant to help reduce energy-related impacts 
on climate change since hydropower is recognized as a low-carbon source of energy. 
 
While land and water grabbing share similarities based on the purpose for which these 
resources may be grabbed, the chapter also establishes that similar actors—states, investors 
and institutional frameworks laws, policies—are also featured in both land and water 
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grabbing. Finally, on the basis of the political ecology analysis, the chapter reveals that 
water grabbing, like land grabbing, involves control of water resources and often results in 
social dispossession, marginalization and environmental conflict. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
OCEAN GRABBING 
5.1 Introduction 
 
The chapter examines the concept of ocean grabbing. It begins by assessing what 
constitutes the ocean and discussing the significance of the ocean and ocean resources in 
the lives of those who depend on them. It further describes activities, actions, and reforms 
that can be classified as ocean grabbing. Like the chapters on other resources within the 
thesis, political economy analytical variables, including institutions, actors, their interests, 
and effects of ocean grabbing, are also assessed in this chapter. This analyzed the concept 
of ocean grabbing within the tenets of these variables with the aimed of contextualizing 
ocean grabbing with land and water grabbing. 
 
5.2 The Ocean as a Political Object 
 
The ocean covers more than 72 percent of the earth’s surface and constitutes 90 percent of 
all the space on Earth capable of sustaining life (Wilson, 2014). The oceans constitute part 
of the essential structure of human culture, linking global economies through trade and 
shipping and providing food and resources for humans around the world. The economic 
impact of the ocean is enormous, providing about $3 trillion in goods and services each 
year. More than three billion people live within one hundred miles of the ocean, where the 
economy and the environment are dominated by marine influence (Wilson, 2014).  
 
Oceans also contribute to food security by making food available through fisheries. 
Fisheries contribute to food security directly by providing fish for people, especially low-
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income consumers, to eat, thereby improving both food availability and the adequacy of 
diets; and indirectly, by generating income from the fisheries sector (De Schutter, 2012). 
The total contribution of fisheries to food consumption has grown substantially over the 
past 50 years, averaging an increase of more than three percent annually. Global per capita 
fish consumption stands at some 18.4 kg per annum (FAO, 2012).  
 
On the global scale, fish forms 15 percent of all animal protein for human consumption 
with the figure being higher in low-income countries, including 20 - 23 percent in Asia and 
half of animal protein in West and Central Africa such as Congo, Gabon, Côte d’Ivoire and 
Ghana (FAO, 2008). There are about 30 countries, of which 22 are in the low-income food 
deficit countries, with fish forming two-thirds of their animal protein (FAO, 2008). This 
demonstrates the significance of the ocean in enhancing food security, particularly for the 
poor and low-income earners. 
 
In addition to playing a fundamental role in global food security, the oceans also contribute 
to the livelihoods of those who depend on the ocean and its resources. This occurs through 
the generation of employment and income. For instance, fisheries and aquaculture directly 
employ 54.8 million people worldwide, and another 150 million people indirectly (UN, 
2012). In developing countries, where most fishing-related employments reside, small-
scale fishing serves as a major source of employment for millions of people and provides 
a greater distribution of benefits than industrial methods (Paul, 2007). For instance, 
industrial boats employ some 200 people for every 1,000 tons of fish caught, while small-
scale fishing methods (used by 90 to 95 percent of people in the fisheries sector) employ 
some 2,400 people for the same amount of fish (FAO and WorldFish Center, 2008). 
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Women, moreover, constitute about 50 percent of the fisheries workforce and are typically 
engaged in the pre-harvest and postharvest sector (Mills et al., 2011). The ocean is, 
therefore, a very important source of livelihood globally and in the Global South in 
particular, providing employment and income to millions of people. 
 
The oceans have been explored and exploited by humans for centuries, resulting in an 
immeasurable wealth of knowledge and scientific and technological innovation. Despite 
these years of advancements, scientists estimate that less than five percent of the ocean has 
been explored.  It is estimated that there are at least a million species of multicellular marine 
organisms and that there may be tens or hundreds of millions of marine microbes, the vast 
majority of which remain unknown to science. Those who argue in favor of ocean 
explorations are of the view that the increasing importance of the ocean and ocean 
resources provide enough ground for a continuous study and research about oceanic life 
and ecology (Wilson, 2014). The astounding lack of knowledge about the oceans highlights 
the importance of studying not just ocean resource but also the concept and practices of 
ocean grabbing.   
 
5.3 Ocean Grabbing 
 
The continuous exploitation of the oceans and oceanic resources in the twenty-first century 
has become critical for the survival of oceans, yet human activities continue to increasingly 
facilitate the degradation of the marine environment to the extent that many of the world’s 
oceanic ecosystems are on the brink of collapse. There is increasing concern over access 
and usage of the ocean as a result of a number of factors such as climate change, 
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overfishing, oceanic acidification, pollution, and other human-induced activities which 
threaten both oceanic life and the continuation of human society (Barry et al., 2003). The 
tensions concerning rights of access, usage, and possession of the ocean and their 
associated obligations pertaining thereto are similar to those pertaining to land and water. 
The emergence of land and water grabbing has fueled recent debates in the literature on 
ocean grabbing, which is a relatively new term that is increasingly applied to a wide variety 
of development, conservation, and fisheries management initiatives and transactions 
(Bennett et al., 2015).  
 
 Bennett et al.  (2015) define ocean grabbing by posing the following questions, “what 
defines an initiative, policy or action as ocean grabbing? What forms might it take? What 
is being grabbed and driven by what? Who is doing the grabbing? Who is being impacted 
and how? Who is benefiting? And how or what are the processes and actions through which 
ocean grabbing is occurring?”  Based on these questions, the authors define ocean grabbing 
as: 
 dispossession or appropriation of use, control or access to oceans space or 
 resources from prior resource users, rights holders or inhabitants. Ocean 
 grabbing occurs through inappropriate governance processes and might  employ 
 acts that undermine the human security or  livelihoods or produce impacts that 
 impair social–ecological well-being. Ocean grabbing can be perpetrated by 
 public institutions or private interests (Bennett et al., 2015:63).  
 
This definition reveals two physical entities that are being grabbed, namely resources and 
space and it occurs through means such as the illegal harvest of (marine) resources, 
dispossession of land for tourism, the encroachment of actors into an area for resource 
extraction; relocation and dispossession of communities after natural disasters. 
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In terms of resources, Bennett et al.  (2015) classified ocean resources into living (fisher 
and other species) and non-living (including rocks or substrate minerals and hydrocarbons) 
resources; historically, ocean grabbing was first limited to the capturing of fishing stock. 
Marine and coastal spaces, on the other hand, include zones of the surface of the sea, the 
sea floor, the water column, beaches, coastal dunes or bluffs, lagoons, coral reefs, 
mangrove forests or seagrass meadows. These physical spaces can be associated with 
economic activities, historical importance as areas with spiritual or cultural significance, 
and resources that are deeply interconnected with customary practices or long-standing 
governance institutions (Bennett et al.  2015). Ocean resources, therefore, have multi-
faceted significance that go beyond economic and instrumental values.  
 
The concept of ocean grabbing, according to Franco et al. (2014), seeks to cast new light 
on important processes and dynamics that are negatively affecting those particularly local 
communities and individuals whose way of life, cultural identity, and livelihoods depend 
solely on their involvement in small-scale fishing and closely related activities. Franco et 
al. thus see ocean grabbing as the taking of control by powerful economic actors in charge 
of making crucial decisions involving fisheries, such as the power to decide how and for 
what purposes ocean resources are used, conserved and managed now and in the future. As 
a result, these powerful actors, whose major aim is a profit motive, are increasingly gaining 
control of both fisheries resources and the benefits of their use to the detriment of small-
scale fishers. 
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Ocean grabbing has been identified to occur through shady access agreements that harm 
small-scale fishers, unreported catch, incursions into protected waters, and the diversion of 
resources away from local populations. This can be as serious a threat as land and water 
grabbing (UNO, 2012) as the process leads not only to a reduction of control by small-
scale fishers over these resources but also, in most cases, to their ecological destruction 
and very disappearance (Franco et al., 2014). Indigenous communities and sustainable 
fishing are continuously threatened by long-distance, industrial-scale trawling through 
ocean grabbing. Ocean grabbing, like other forms of resource grabbing, also occurs through 
policies, laws, and practices that are redefining and reallocating access, use and control of 
fisheries resources away from small-scale fishers and their communities, and often with 
little concern for the adverse environmental consequences (UNO, 2012).   
 
There has been a long history of attempts to acquire and formalize exclusive and restrictive 
rights to particular areas of the ocean and its resources by means of proclamations, laws, 
treaties and naval force. Claims, disputes, laws and treaties over navigation, fishing and 
trading can be traced back through the histories of various European nations (Guy, 2000). 
Developments in the international law of the sea have also encouraged nations to extend 
their areas of sovereignty in order to protect, manage and exploit the ocean environment 
and resources. In some cases, this involves a substantial area. For instance, New Zealand's 
exclusive economic zone (EEZ) amounts to more than 20 times that country's land area 
(Robertson et al., 1999). The emergence of the United Nations sanctioned EEZs as part of 
the Law of the Sea conventions constitute a form of ocean enclosure and property making 
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(Foley, Mather, and Neis, 2015) that can be considered a form of comprehensive ocean 
grabbing by nation states.  
 
There is increasing concern over access and usage of the oceans as a result of a number of 
factors such as technological advances in mining and fishing. Many harmful environmental 
impacts associated with these activities are also concerning with the major impacts being 
felt by the small-scale fishers whose livelihoods depend on them. Continual incidents of 
pollution, poaching and overfishing have endangered certain biological species, which are 
being exploited commercially, even though there is an insufficient scientific knowledge to 
estimate what are sustainable levels of exploitation (Barry et al., 2003). 
 
Not all conservation or development actions involving reallocation of space or ocean 
resources constitute ocean grabbing. Drawing lessons from the literature debates on land 
grabbing, Bennett et al. (2015) proposed three overreaching considerations that provide a 
solid basis to determine whether or not an initiative constitutes ocean grabbing – the quality 
of governance; the presence of actions that undermine human security and livelihoods; and 
impacts that negatively affect social–ecological well-being. Each of these initiatives 
provides criteria that serve as a framework for evaluating policies, initiatives, and actions. 
This framework is explained in below.  
 
The quality of governance is the first fundamental consideration in assessing what 
constitutes ocean grabbing. Governance involves the structures, institutions and processes 
by which decisions are made and actions are taken and the quality of such structures, 
institutions, and processes play a vital role in resources management and allocations. 
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Quality governance takes into considerations and employs pre-existing national and local 
laws, governance arrangements and management processes to determine whether an 
initiative aligned with local and national aspirations and priorities. Good governance is also 
participatory and transparent. One main issue associated with grabbing is a lack of 
consultations with affected groups and shady deals involving such processes. Participatory 
governance ensures that proper processes and structures are put in place for decision-
making, including building the capacities of affected groups, access to information and 
adequate resources to participate while transparency enhances the absences of fugitive 
corrupting forces (e.g., influential figures) that act on governing in invisible ways; or the 
normalization of corrupt behaviors in natural resources dealings. 
 
Respect for human rights and accountability are also associated with good and quality 
governance. Respect for human rights takes into recognition the rule of law and the right 
to seek legal redress; historical tenure, rights and ownership and ensures that outstanding 
issues are well resolved. By accountability, promoters, governors, and managers are held 
responsible for the process of implementation and impacts of the initiatives and actions, 
which serve as checks on corruption, coercion or embezzlement. Quality governance is, 
therefore, a normative social contract between the state, the private sector, and civil society 
about the way that actors should perform and actions should occur. Such governance 
ensures that actions that undermine democratic institutions, local customs, and rules or pre-
existing governance arrangements or policies (particularly involving natural resources) that 
marginalize vulnerable groups are not acceptable and, therefore, should not transpire. 
Therefore, any policies, actions or initiatives concerning usage, privatization and allocation 
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of oceans and ocean resources that do not recognize these basic features of quality 
governance constitute ocean grabbing (Bennett, et al., 2015). 
 
A second consideration according to Bennett et al. (2015) is to assess whether actions 
guarantee or undermines livelihood and human security of those affected, particularly 
vulnerable groups. According to the authors, human security involves a state of safety from 
harm or feeling of freedom from existential dangers or threats to a referent object. Human 
security takes into account the safety, survival, well-being, livelihoods and dignity of the 
individual and guarantees freedom from wants, fears or harms, and liberty to pursue one's 
aspirations. An initiative is therefore considered as ocean grabbing when such initiative 
through the enclosure of public space or privatization of common-pool resources takes 
away the livelihoods and undermines food security of the affected groups (Bennett et al. 
(2015).  
 
Such initiatives also threaten the security of both individuals and the affected communities. 
Community security is at risk when the initiative results in physical displacement; threatens 
the existence, cohesiveness or cultural identity of a community or an ethnic group; and 
facilitates the destruction of cultural resources or undermine traditional activities or 
governance processes. For personal security, the initiative should serve as a threat to 
personal safety; lead to violence being perpetrated against individuals and lack of respect 
for and protection of human rights. Taking the seven delineated aspects of human security 
(economic, food, health, environmental, personal, community and political) developed by 
the 1994 UNDP Human Development Report as their point of departure, the authors 
believe the categories of livelihoods and food security, personal and political security and 
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community security are most useful for understanding what constitutes ocean grabbing 
(Bennett, et al., 2015).  
 
The final consideration is whether the policy, initiative or action produces negative 
ecological outcomes or direct impacts that affect the well-being of proximal communities 
or vulnerable groups.  The term ‘social–ecological well- being’ as used by the authors 
recognizes the linked character of well-being within the coastal social–ecological systems 
impacted by ocean grabbing. This means that in terms of ecological impacts, the policy, 
initiative or action is seen as ocean grabbing if it produces undesirable ecological outcomes 
for resource users, rights holders or inhabitants and leads to adverse outcomes for 
ecosystem services (e.g., sustainability of the resource, fish catches) that local people rely 
on. If such initiatives also result in the pollution of the marine resources and negatively 
impact the health of the environment, including resources that are harvested, then the 
activities can be considered ocean grabbing (Bennett, et al., 2015). Socially, ocean 
grabbing occurs when the ecological impacts of an initiative lead to adverse social 
outcomes (e.g., on health, livelihoods, food security, poverty/wealth, social and cultural 
factors, institutions, overall well-being) for local people, particularly the affected group. 
These actions or initiatives have negative impacts on social-ecological relationships and 
feedbacks and the social costs far exceed that of social benefits.  
 
Bennett et al. (2015) believe that the development of coastal areas and the well-being of 
occupants depend on the health of the environment, the abundance of resources and the 
intactness and productivity of habitats. Development initiatives, including the allocation of 
ocean space and resources, may have negative impacts on the ocean resources that serve 
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as a major source of livelihood for millions of local communities. These include pollution 
of water bodies for drinking and overfishing by commercial and distant water fleets. But 
the simple act of reallocation does not determine whether an initiative is an instance of 
ocean grabbing precisely because actions that involve the reallocation of space and 
resources are always occurring, be they for environmental management, conservation or 
economic development purposes. An aquaculture or marine scheme could be called ocean 
grabbing if the processes are in line with the three considerations discussed and the reverse 
is true for policies, actions or initiatives that are implemented in a respectful manner; that 
support local livelihoods and do not undermine human security, and that produce favorable 
social– ecological outcomes.  
 
5.4 Political Economy of Ocean Grabbing 
 
Ocean grabbing, according to the limited research that exists on the topic, occurs in 
different ways in a different social, economic and political settings. One common feature 
(as observed in literature) is the control of marine resources and exclusion of small-scale 
fishers from their main sources of livelihood through formulation and reformulation of 
laws, regulations and policies pertaining to ocean governance. These processes occur 
through the actions of actors and their interests, and interactions of institutional 
frameworks.  
 
Ocean grabbing is shaped by political economic forces in many instances. The key driving 
force underpinning specific mechanisms of ocean grabbing today are the underlying logic 
of the current economic system, where capital accumulation is linked to increasing 
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corporate control over access to and ‘conservation’ of natural resources. Numerous factors 
and actors can be seen facilitating this trend. Governments, regional and international 
governmental institutions, international environmental organizations, large-scale corporate 
companies, and philanthropic foundations are among the key actors that are involved in 
market-based reforms and policies that ultimately allow for ocean grabbing to take place 
(Franco et al., 2014). 
 
Table 5.1 Actors/Stakeholders in Ocean Grabbing 
Actors Interests/Roles Influence on Ocean 
Grabbing 
Domestic States Ocean policies, personal/economic 
benefits, Marine Protected Areas 
Positive (±) 
Foreign States food production for security, Investments 
in fisheries 
Positive/Negative 
(±) 
Large-scale corporate 
fishing/ Transnational 
corporations 
Investments (large-scale fishing, 
conversion of coastal areas) 
Positive/Negative 
(+) 
International 
Environmental 
Organizations 
Ocean policies, provision of advocacy 
service 
Positive/Negative (-) 
Small-scale fishers Protection of livelihoods and cultural 
values 
Negative (-) 
Source: Author, Construct, March, 2016 
 
States’ involvements in ocean grabbing include an introduction, reformulation, and 
justification of fishery reforms such as the RBF (Franco et al. 2014); definition, mapping 
and quantification of marine resources and fish stock; and affirmation of state sovereignty 
and authority over territorial waters. Such authority of marine territories gives states the 
power to decide how, for what purposes and by whom, ocean and marine resources could 
be used including policies and reforms that guide the management of these resources 
(Foley, et al., 2015). Such authorities in areas such as land control are associated with the 
use of force by states’ security apparatus to achieving compliance. Beyond states, both 
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domestic and international actors including transnational corporations are involved in 
ocean grabbing. Such transnational corporations include (eco)tourism, agribusinesses and 
the extractive industries, who often are able to exert influence on policies and economic 
agreements geared towards access and control of oceans and ocean resources. 
 
Apart from these actors are the interests that influence the actions of these actors towards 
ocean grabbing. Franco et al. (2014) reveal three main driving factors that promote ocean 
grabbing. The authors attribute the first factor to the emergence of a complex corporate 
(sea)food regime reconfiguring production chains, with an ongoing vertical and horizontal 
integration that concentrates control over fish access, processing, and retailing activities 
into the hands of a few powerful players and elites. According to them, the corporate sea 
regime has influenced an increase in demand for certain types of fishery products in both 
the Global North and South. This has resulted in industrial interest in decision-making 
power in the model of fish production resulting in the expansion of industrial models of 
exploitation of fish resources and practices that is detrimental to small-scale fishing 
communities and marine ecosystems. This usually happens when there is a heavy industrial 
reliance on large-scale fishing to meet the increasing demand for fish with the results that 
policies and decisions involving fisheries are skewed towards large-scale fishing at the 
expense of small-scale fishing. 
 
The second factor is attributed to lucrativeness, which is associated with the permanent 
physical conversion and privatization of lands and sea into profit-making ventures such as 
for industrial, recreational and varieties of activities. These conversions and privatizations 
include private real estate developments on coastlines; ecotourism zones around marine 
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hotspots, extractive industry in inland, offshore and sea-bed areas; agro-industrial 
plantations in river deltas and watershed areas. These forms of conversions affect the 
operations and management of coastal areas as well as marine resources with major 
negative impacts mostly felt by small-scale fishers as far as their activities are concerned 
(Franco et al., 2014). 
The third and the final factor involves financialization of natural resources, which is also 
associated with land and water grabbing (Fairbain, 2014). This involves the extended reach 
of financial capital into control of natural resources such as the ocean fisheries. For 
instance, the commodification of the right to fish with individual transferable quota markets 
enabled a British investment firm to acquire quotas in the US catch-share system 
amounting to a quarter of all US clam-based products. Financialization of ocean resources 
is also currently being manifested by attempts by the World Bank to transfer part of its $15 
billion ‘green bonds’ (loans for ‘sustainable projects’) to oceans as ‘Blue Bonds’, arguing 
that private large-scale financial capital is essential to achieve better marine protection and 
governance. This has major detrimental effects on the operations of small-scale fishers 
(Franco et al., 2014). 
 
5.5 Effects of Ocean Grabbing 
 
Ocean grabbing, like both land and water grabbing, negatively affects prior resource users, 
rights holders or inhabitants. The categories of those affected include marginalized and 
vulnerable coastal communities and groups, such as small-scale fishers, traditional land-
owners, historical tenure holders, indigenous groups, and women. It is important to give 
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adequate gender considerations in discussing ocean grabbing since women fishers may 
access and use different areas and resources than men (Bennett et al., 2015). Ocean 
grabbing exposes small-scale fishers who mostly rely on artisanal modes of fishing to a 
stiffer competition from large fleets (FAO, 2012). People are also often excluded from 
trading and processing the catches because of the concentration of supply-chain activities 
into relatively few selected large-scale facilities that are increasingly oriented toward 
export markets (Franco et al, 2014). 
 
Ocean grabbing threatens the sustainability of oceans. For instance, there has been 
tremendous growth in fishing capacity worldwide since 1950 with the number and power 
of fishing vessels increasing dramatically. Between 1970 and 1990, global fish harvesting 
capacity grew eight times faster than the rate of growth in landings and this threatens the 
survival of ocean resources (De Shutter, 2012). It has been projected that because of 
overcapacity and technology creep, the capacity of the global aggregate fishing fleet is, at 
least, double that which is needed to exploit the oceans sustainably due to ocean grabbing 
(Garcia and Gainger, 2005). 
 
Ocean grabbing also exacerbates serious social, economic and cultural dispossession, 
destruction and depletion, as linked to a variety of large-scale economic activities, ranging 
from large-scale industrial fishing to extractive industries and infrastructure development 
projects (Franco, et al., 2014). People and communities are dispossessed of their long-
established customary rights to access fishing grounds and water bodies, and the associated 
coastal lands that border these. By enclosing or destroying marine and aquatic environment 
of fishers and occupants of coastal areas, the impacts of ocean grabbing is a disruption of 
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their means of livelihoods, subsistence, culture, traditions and social cohesion. This is an 
absolute threat to the lives of those affected, including their ways of living and knowledge 
gained over generations. 
   
5.6 Political Ecology of Ocean Grabbing 
 
5.6.1 Conservation and Control 
 
 
Conservation occurs in ocean management when fishers are restricted from fishing in 
certain marine areas or when Marine Protected Areas (MPAs) are instituted, which places 
restrictions or bans in certain areas previously occupied for the purpose of marine 
protection and conservation. Marine conservation does affect small-scale fishers more than 
the large-scale fishers and tends to strict them from their main source of livelihoods (Franco 
et al., 2014). 
 
Apart from conservation, which tends to dispossess small-scale fishers, ocean, and marine 
resources are controlled by states through laws and policies; the definition, mapping and 
quantification of marine resources and fish stock often occurs through state policies (De 
Shutter, 2012). States’ authority over coastal ocean zones allow states to make decisions 
concerning how the ocean and its resources should be managed which are usually 
detrimental to small-scale fishers and indigenous communities whose livelihoods depend 
on these resources. The ocean and its resources are also increasingly taken either by states 
or by private investors away from small-scale users or fishers. This occurs primarily 
through the privatization of resources for profit-making ventures such as for industrial, 
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recreational and varieties of activities (Bennett et al., 2015). Such control impacts marine 
areas negatively and also takes away the access to the ocean for other actors. 
 
5.6.2 Marginalization and Degradation 
 
Ocean grabbing, like other resource grabbing, does put grabbees at a disadvantage in terms 
of their access and use of resources. Small-scale fishers, traditional land-owners, historical 
tenure holders, indigenous groups, and women are those who are typically made worse off 
and therefore relegated to the background by the activities and actions that constitute ocean 
grabbing. People and communities are marginalized through a dispossession of their long-
established customary rights to access fishing grounds and water bodies, and the associated 
coastal land. Ocean grabbing also brings about related social, economic and cultural 
marginalization. (Bennett et al., 2015). 
 
Ocean grabbing creates stiffer competition for small-scale fishers by promoting the 
activities of large-scale investments. Through the concentration of supply-chain activities 
into relatively few selected large-scale facilities, small-scale fishers are often excluded 
from trading and processing of catches involved in the fishery. Ocean grabbing, therefore, 
marginalizes those affected in the areas of livelihood, subsistence, culture, traditions and 
social cohesions (Franco et al., 2014).  
 
Ocean grabbing does not only marginalize the present generation but also puts the 
sustainability of marine resources at risk, which has negative impacts on the future 
generation. Permanent physical conversion of coastal areas, coupled with over-fishing by 
larger fleets, tends to affect the sustainability of coastal areas and ocean resources. With 
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the capacities of larger fleets projected to double, the survival of the ocean and those who 
depend on it will be affected and also threaten to also marginalize future generations 
(Franco et al., 2014). 
 
5.7 Summary of Chapter Five 
 
Although research on ocean grabbing is just beginning, the synthesis of the literature 
provided in this thesis points to several tentative lessons. Ocean grabbing is different from 
land and water grabbing in terms of the nature of the resource; however, ocean grabbing, 
like land and water grabbing, tends to occur through the actions of state and corporate 
actors to serve corporate interests within specific institutional frameworks. Like land and 
water grabbing, ocean grabbing also negatively effects of small-scale producers in the 
Global South. It also involves control of ocean resources from small-scale holders, which 
results in marginalization of these holders as well as the degradation of ocean resources 
and sometimes conflicts between small-scale fishers and investors. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSIONS 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter provides a comparative analysis of the various resource grabbing forms and 
debates – land, water and the ocean. The chapter analyzes and compares resource grabbing 
within the tenets of political ecology and political economy. The chapter also proposes an 
approach for policy frameworks by identifying how political economy analysis could aid 
in policy formulation towards curbing resource grabbing. 
 
6.2 What Constitutes Resource Grabbing? 
 
There is no single definition of resource grabbing for the various resources (land, water 
and ocean) within the resource grabbing debates. Definitions of what is resource grabbing 
depend on the prevailing causal factors, the spatial and socio-economic settings, how the 
resources are used or exploited, the effects and sometimes the size of the resources 
acquired. 
 
The Food and Agricultural Organization, for instance, in defining land grabbing reveals 
that land deals are to be understood as land grabs when three conditions are present, 
namely: the scale of land deals should be large; there should be the direct involvement of 
foreign governments and institutions; and the new land investments are seen to have a 
negative impact on the food security of the recipient country. Other definitions identified 
earlier in the thesis take into consideration the power to control resources, the scale of land, 
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and capital accumulation as a major influence in contemporary land grabbing. This 
signifies a lack of a standard definition for the term, land grabbing.  
 
Taking a closer look raises questions including; what might be a standard scale of land to 
be considered as land grabbing? Can we describe land acquisition within a family, where 
women are dispossessed of land for example, as land grabbing, even though those whose 
lands are grabbed experience similar effects? While the land grab literature focuses largely 
on foreign companies and foreign and domestic states, work on crop booms goes further 
by showing how not just domestic capital but also smallholders have tried to take or keep 
control over land on which to grow boom crops (Hall 2011; Hall 2013). While wading into 
the debate of land grabbing, it is clear that small-scale acquisitions affect small-scale 
farmers and land users in similar ways as large-scale land acquisitions. These and much 
more of such related questions cast new light on the problem of defining criteria for what 
constitutes land grabbing. Apart from these questions, evidence from the literature also 
reveals there is no agreement and reliable data as to the global scale of actual land 
acquisition, which makes it difficult to understand the nature of large scale land 
acquisitions.  
 
The definition of water grabbing has not stemmed much controversy as compared to land 
grabbing in terms of media debates and research. This has been attributed to the positive 
relationship between land and water grabbing as many kinds of literature suggest that land 
may be grabbed not for the land itself but for water resources and the opposite could be 
true for water grabbing. The definition of water grabbing, however, takes into consideration 
certain aspects of land grabbing as provided in the literature, including control of resources 
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from prior resource users by a powerful person or actor with its associated effects similar 
to the effects of land grabbing. 
 
 The definition of ocean grabbing also takes into consideration most of the elements of land 
and water grabbing, including access and control of resources, dispossession and 
deprivation of livelihood (particularly on the parts of powerless resource owners and users). 
The definition of ocean grabbing goes beyond just access and control to include 
competition for marine resources (mainly fishery resources) between artisanal fishermen 
(small-scale fishers) and large-scale actors and interests with the former being at a 
disadvantage in terms of policies, decisions and initiatives and even available resources 
(technology) to compete in the Global South.  
 
Despite the slight differences and criticisms that exist in the definition of resource grabbing 
debates, three main factors exist in all the definitions. These factors provide a means of 
analyzing resource grabbing, irrespective of the usual factors considered, such as size and 
quantity of resources, and spatial and socio-economic settings. The first factor involves 
actors. Resource grabbing involves beneficiaries (grabbers) and losers (grabbees) and 
sometimes decision-makers who more or less also benefit from the outcomes of the 
resources that have been grabbed. All the definitions of resource grabbing take into 
consideration individuals or actors (whether within a family, a community, a country or a 
globally) who benefit (including access and control) from the resources belonging to 
another individual or actor, often with less power and means of protecting their resources. 
The actors also include those who are seen as facilitators of resource grabbing. These 
include governments and decision-makers (could be politicians, bureaucrats, chiefs, 
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community leaders, and elders within a family) who influence such acquisitions through 
processes and procedures in favor of those who are grabbing the resources. 
 
Figure 6.1: What Constitutes Resource Grabbing? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Author’s Construct 
 
All types of resource grabbing have causes or causal factors, which are influenced by 
motives/interests and made possible by institutions and institutional frameworks. 
Preceding discussions, for instance, identifies interests in expanding agriculture and food 
production to meet increasingly demands for food or future needs of food insecure 
countries as a major cause of land and water grabbing. This factor is similar to a major 
cause of ocean grabbing: the heavy industrial reliance on large-scale fishing to meet the 
increasing demand for fish with the result that policies and decisions involving fisheries 
are skewed towards large-scale fishing at the expense of small-scale fishing.  
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101 
 
This implies that all resource grabbing, being land, water and ocean grabbing have both 
pull and push factors that influence the decision to grab such resources. The pull factors 
involve what attracts grabbers and include the increase in demand for food, biofuel and 
fish production; weak and shady regulatory frameworks involving resource management; 
weak and powerless resource holders; and corrupt leaders and politicians entrusted with or 
at the helm of control resources. The push factors, on the other hand, involve the driving 
force for land investment from the perspective of grabbers. These include the perception 
of ‘unused’ or ‘vacant’ productive resources in the Global South; the recent need for 
increases in food and biofuel production; the recent boom in investment interest in natural 
resources; and direct assistance from foreign institutions for development purposes. 
 
Finally, the evidence presented in the chapters above suggest that resource grabbing for 
land, water and ocean have both positive and negative effects with the negatives mostly 
felt by those whose resources are being taken or grabbed (grabbees). On the positive side, 
many land deals involving resource acquisition contain certain premises of benefits 
including increases in food production, employment, income, technology and financial 
transfer associated with large-scale land and water investment as well as some large-scale 
fishery developments. However, scant evidence exists with regards to whether these 
benefits have been received or not, particularly in land grabbing.  
 
On the negative side, all forms of resource grabbing have been associated with 
dispossession and displacement of social, economic, and culture lives of ‘grabbees’. 
Resource grabbing has resulted in local food insecurity, loss of employment and major 
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sources of livelihoods. These effects contribute immensely in infringing upon the 
fundamental human rights of resource user and owners. 
 
Not only are negative effects felt by those whose resources are being taken but the effects 
also experienced by the resource which is exploited. Evidence in the literature reveals that 
land grabbing in parts of Global South has had negative effects on water bodies and major 
environmental resources, including soil erosion, water depletion, increased pesticide use, 
more emissions of climate change gasses, and the loss of biodiversity. Ocean grabbing also 
threatens the sustainability of oceans, particularly due to overfishing.  
 
This thesis suggests that resource grabbing as a concept has no single clear definition and 
key debates associated with the definitions of land, water and ocean will continue. The 
three analytical factors described above, however, can be used in assessing the concept and 
practices of resources grabbing. The factors, moreover, provide a basis for comparing 
resource grabbing in different contexts within and across sectors or resources. 
 
6.3 Comparative Analysis 
 
Land, water and ocean grabbing appear to exist in isolation in terms of the purpose for 
which these resources are grabbed but there are important similarities in terms of the actors, 
motives (interest), institutional frameworks and effects. Such comparative political 
economy analysis provides a means of comparing and better understanding relationships 
between land, water and ocean grabbing. The following discussion focuses on these 
dimensions of analysis and insight. 
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6.3.1 Actors and their Interests 
 
The first similarity involves access and control of resources by grabbers with similar 
interest/motives. Land grabbing, for instance, involves control of resources (land) with a 
motive of making use of and gaining something either directly (i.e. putting the land into 
productive use for food production or commodity production) or indirectly (other resources 
or benefits that can be obtained indirectly from controlling the land (i.e. rent, investment 
and profit). Such control is normally exercised by the actors who are usually more powerful 
than those whose lands are being grabbed. Water grabbing also, is a process in which 
powerful actors (e.g. states and investors) are able to take control of, or reallocate to their 
own benefit water resources used by local communities or which feed aquatic ecosystems 
on which their livelihoods are based. Control is also introduced in ocean grabbing, which 
involves control or access to ocean space or resources from prior resource users, rights 
holders or inhabitants. Resource grabbing, therefore, involves access and control of 
resources from prior resource owners, right holders, inhabitants or users. 
 
6.3.2 Institutions and Institutional Frameworks 
 
Actors including states, international organizations, and foreign investors (governments of 
other countries or international corporations) play important roles in cases of land, water 
and ocean grabbing. Recipient states play critical roles in promoting resource grabbing 
through favorable policies, laws, and practices that are (re)defining and (re)allocating 
access, use and control of resources away rightful owners and their communities. These 
policies, laws and practices are often weak and shaped by corrupt practice and leaders (e.g. 
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politicians, traditional leaders), which tend to formalize exclusive and restrictive rights to 
particular resources away from their rightful holders or inhabitants by means of these weak 
or questionably designed regulatory and legal frameworks. 
 
Domestic states’ role in resource grabbing is sometimes driven by the personal or economic 
benefits received by the politicians or the bureaucrats with the power to facilitate such 
deals. One main issue associated with resource grabbing is a lack of consultations with 
affected groups and shady deals involving such processes. State officials, therefore, 
influence resource grabbing by helping investors to get around their regulatory and 
practical challenges through these shady/non-transparent deals. It is therefore believed that 
resource grabbing is usually found to a greater degree in countries where corrupt and 
unaccountable decision-making exists, combined with poverty and powerlessness, and 
most of these countries have been identified to be located in the Global South. 
 
International corporations and foreign states also play active roles in the processes involved 
in the grabbing of various resources. This has been attributed to the financialization of 
natural resources involving the introduction of financial resources into the access and 
control of resources including land, water and the oceans. Transnational companies or 
states seek to secure access and control of natural resources (land, water and ocean) in 
developing countries (mostly in the Global South) for agricultural (food and biofuel 
production) and non-agricultural purposes. This is sought to take advantage of the booming 
markets and increase in food and fish prices as well as lucrative investments in biofuel 
production. 
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Quite apart from these involvements of foreign corporations, states and institutions is the 
existence of international laws and policies that promote resource grabbing. Bilateral 
donors and IFIs have been active in natural resource policy reforms, sometimes as a 
conditionality for loans.  The World Bank Group, for instance, uses methods such as policy 
advice on liberalization investment and land access policies; technical assistance in the 
actual drafting of laws and regulations; maintaining indicators of investment-friendliness 
countries and providing help such as policy advice and funding, to get states in the Global 
South to open up to land investment for countries. International involvement in resource 
grabbing also includes the formulation of the international law of the sea to encourage 
nations to extend their areas of sovereignty in order to protect, manage and exploit the 
ocean environment and resources. A typical example is the introduction of the exclusive 
economic zone (EEZ), which consolidates states control over coastal fisheries and oceans 
resources. These policies have been followed, in many states, by a large-scale privatization 
of fisheries resources. 
 
6.3.3 Effects 
 
Finally, land, water and ocean grabbing have similar effects, particularly with regards to 
the negative impacts on those whose resources are being taken. These negative effects are 
categorized into two forms:  1) on the rightful resource holders and 2) on the actual 
resources and other environmental conditions associated with that particular resource. In 
terms of effects on original resource holders, four areas have been common in all the 
resource grabbing debates: issues of 1) dispossession, 2) livelihood, 3) food security, and 
4) human rights. 
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Dispossession and Displacements 
 
On the issues of dispossession, as discussed in previous chapters, there have been several 
instances where land deals in the Global South have resulted in displacement, 
dispossession, and disenfranchisement of local communities and rural poor which affect 
their basic rights to shelter without proper compensation. Governments have long 
dispossessed rural people, particularly indigenous groups, of their land and resources to 
create conservation projects or in the name of sustainable resource management. Globally, 
between 40-80 million people have been displaced by dams built on their land. A typical 
instance involves the internationally infamous Myitsone Dam project. Recall that this 
project led to displacement thousands (about 12,000) of people. 
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Table 6.1 Common Effects of Resource Grabbing 
Category Areas 
Affected 
Causes Examples 
On Prior 
Resource 
Holders 
Livelihood -Loss of Land, water and 
ocean 
-Loss of employment and 
income 
-Disruption of sacred 
places and places of 
cultural importance 
-Allocation of million hectares 
of arable lands and water 
resources to private investors in 
Mozambique, Ethiopia, India, 
Ghana etc. 
-Allocation of large quota to 
large-scale fleets in South 
Africa 
Dispossession - Creation of conservation 
projects 
-Resource management 
-Privatization 
-Displacement of about 12000 
people by Myitsone Dam 
project 
-Allocation of coastal 
concessions to private interests 
in Honduras  
- privatization of mangrove 
forests in Bangladesh 
Food Security -Dispossession of peasant 
farmers and fishermen 
-Food exportation 
-Food security issues in 
Ethiopia 
 
Human 
Rights 
-Loss of livelihood 
-Dispossession 
-Loss of food security 
-Resource conflict 
-Violence and civil conflicts 
associated with Salween River 
dams in South East Asia 
-Instances of abuse of women 
in most developing countries 
On 
Environmental 
Resources 
 -Overfishing 
-Chemical discharge 
-Overuse of technology 
-Depletion of fishing stock 
-Soil erosion 
-Water depletion  
-Emissions of climate change 
gasses 
-Loss of biodiversity 
Source: Author’s Construct, 2016 
 
Small-scale fishers, through ocean grabbing, have also been displaced and dispossessed 
from their fishing ports and communities through the privatization of coastal areas to large 
local or foreign companies for the purpose of urban development and improvement in 
direct foreign investment. The processes of displacement and dispossession are often 
associated with coercion, forced eviction and sometimes killings. Land grabbing, for 
example, has succeeded in turning farmers and landholders into refugees in their own lands. 
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Dispossession and displacements have major impacts on livelihoods. This is because 
displacements and dispossession result in loss of the means of social, economic, cultural 
and other basic elements important to the sustenance of life of resource owners, inhabitants, 
and users. Resource grabbing is seen as a major threat to the lives and livelihoods of the 
rural poor. Loss of land, water and ocean resources also means a loss of a basic source of 
employment and income, which contributes to escalating poverty among small-scale 
resource holders. 
 
Loss of Livelihoods 
 
Land grabbing results in the loss of livelihoods for thousands of peasants who mainly 
depend on their lands as a source of livelihood. For instance, as noted above, many peasants 
lost their livelihoods in Mozambique due to the allocation of about 1.3 million hectares of 
land to six companies by the government for plantations. In addition to the issues of 
farmland loss, local people have also lost access to native forests including forest products 
for medicinal purposes, home construction, and energy, as well as an additional source of 
income. Also, through stiff competition from large-scale fishers and by enclosing or 
destroying marine and aquatic environment of small-scale fishers and occupants of coastal 
areas, the impacts of ocean grabbing is a disruption of their means of livelihoods, 
subsistence, culture, traditions and social cohesions. 
 
Furthermore, resource grabbing involving land, water and oceans have negative effects on 
the food security of those affected. These large-scale deals in natural resources (land, water 
and the oceans) have been identified to have led to local food insecurity including 
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availability, access and utilization of food. This was caused by dispossessing peasants or 
small-scale fishers from their main source of livelihood and food supply. The worst 
outcomes happen when food produced by investors is exported with the result that the 
locals whose land and fish have been taken look elsewhere for alternative food supplies 
rather than benefiting from local food production. Resource grabbing involves “exporting 
food insecurity” because investors and state supporters are interested in producing food for 
export markets, creating food insecurity for the producers. 
 
Human Rights Abuses 
 
Dispossession and displacement, loss of livelihoods and food security associated with 
resource grabbing, have combined to result in the infringements of fundamental human 
rights of small-scale resource holders and users. For example, loss of access to land (1.3 
million hectares) for food production and water by peasants in Mozambique amounted to 
an infringement of rights of prior holders to food and water. The human rights impacts are 
likely to increase during the coming years as the scale of these projects increases and if 
measures are not put in place to protect right resource holders. Ocean grabbing also affects 
the human rights of marginalized and vulnerable coastal communities and groups, such as 
small-scale fishers, traditional land-owners, historical tenure holders, indigenous groups 
and women by taking away access to their main source of livelihood directly and indirectly. 
 
Aside from physical dispossession, loss of livelihood and food security, resource grabbing 
is also often associated with armed violence and social conflict between resource owners 
and states or investors involved in the resource deals. This has resulted in casualties and 
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sometimes deaths of innocent citizens. For instance, the Salween River dams in South East 
Asia have often been characterized by violence and civil conflicts of the Eastern Border 
States. These projects, based on their locations, have been predicted to compromise the 
security of the local population in terms of safety, livelihoods, water, and food. There are 
many more examples of how people who just want to grow food and make a living from 
their own resources are being expelled, criminalized, and sometimes killed, to make room 
for the production of food and biomass to the benefit of someone else's wealth. As noted 
above, women, who constitute about 70 percent of farmers in developing countries, are the 
most vulnerable to the resource grab human rights abuses as they may not be able to protect 
their own land tenure claims in court due to local laws. 
 
Effects on Natural Resources 
 
The second category of effects of resource grabbing focuses on its effects on land, water 
and the ocean resources and other environmental conditions associated with the use of such 
resources. Land and water grabbing in parts of Global South have resulted in soil erosion, 
water depletion, increased pesticides use, more emissions of climate change gasses, and 
the loss of biodiversity. Land and water grabbing for mining purposes also contaminate 
water through leaching and dumping of tailings. This happens through chemical use and 
discharge during and after mining operations. Finally, ocean grabbing threatens the 
sustainability of oceans, particularly through overfishing by larger fleets using modern 
technologies beyond the capacities of the oceans. 
 
6.4 Resource Grabbing and Political Ecology 
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The concept of resource grabbing as explained in section 2.2 focuses more on 
environmental problems relating to land, water and ocean resource acquisition, control and 
management, usually from the hands of the weak and powerless to the hands of the 
powerful. Political ecology within resource grabbing involves the socio-economic and 
political conditions involved in the acquisition, control and use of resources. The political 
ecology of resource grabbing enhances understanding about the acquisition, use and 
control of resources by studying the relationships between society and nature in contexts 
of power, particularly from the perspective of political economy. For the purposes of this 
thesis, resource grabbing has been discussed within the tenets of the five theses of political 
ecology as defined by Paul Robbins. 
 
The degradation and marginalization thesis focuses on the over-exploitation of resource in 
the Global South as a result of development intervention or to meet market demand. Most 
of the instances of resource grabbing have been a result of an increase in production of 
food, biofuel and fishery to meet increasing global demands for such products.  
 
For instance, the literature reveals that the recent surge of land grabbing cases in the Global 
South is partly a result of the economic interests in addressing and capitalizing on the need 
to meet the future increased demand for food in some countries.  Another instance is the 
increase in demand for certain fish types, which has been influenced by the corporate sea 
regime. The end results of such grabbing include marginalization of prior resources holders 
and users, including peasant farmers, small-scale fishers, and indigenous groups who not 
only lose access to their means of livelihood but also permanently lose access to their 
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resources. This is because resource grabbing ends up degrading the very resource which 
was grabbed due to persisting over-exploitation of resources associated with most incidents 
of resource grabbing in the Global South. 
 
The marginalization and degradation thesis also emphasizes the possibility of sustainable 
communities becoming potentially unsustainable due to state bureaucrats or foreign control 
of common property, such as oceans and water. Pollution of water bodies which, serve as 
a source of drinking water for a particular community, has the potential of making such 
community unsustainability. This, for instance, has effects on their water needs for 
domestic and agricultural purposes, which in turn have negative implications on 
livelihoods. 
 
Competition over and control of resources among powerful and weak groups have the 
tendency of increasing class stratification under conditions of market expansion. This 
creates struggles over limited resources, usually at the expense of the marginalized in 
society in contexts of weak institutional protections. The result is that indigenous groups, 
peasants and small-scale fishers are pushed aside for investors who have the capital to 
invest in such resources. This is even worse where the state is involved, because such 
results in the interest of the elites being served and also encourages further resource 
exploitation.  
 
Land, water and ocean grabbing are often associated with displacement and dispossession, 
loss of livelihood, food insecurity, poverty and insecurity as far as the lives and security of 
prior resources holders are concerned. This also has the potential of making the 
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communities of such holders unsustainable due to these effects associated with resource 
grabbing. Evidence of such happenings has already been detailed in the previous 
discussions. 
 
Control of resources is very common in the recent occurrences of land, water and ocean 
grabbing. Control of resources is often exerted with the belief that most natural resources 
in the Global South are either unused or inefficient in use and, therefore, the demands to 
put such resources in a more efficient utilization to enhance global benefits as well as 
resource conservation. Such control is usually exerted over minority groups (associated 
with class, gender, or ethnicity). An example of such control and conservation in the 
resource grabbing debate is the institutionalization of Marine Protected Areas (MPA), 
which place restrictions or bans in certain marine areas previously occupied for the purpose 
of marine protection and conservation. Another instance is the development of national 
parks in the name of land conservation associated with land grabbing. 
 
The environmental conflict and exclusion thesis argues that environmental problems 
become struggled over with actors such as state authorities, private firms, or social elites 
competing to control collective resources at the expense of others. This thesis has been 
commonly manifested in resource grabbing in the Global South where owners and 
occupiers (grabbees) of such resources mostly have no means of securing their resources 
other than to fight to protect them. Examples of resource conflicts described above include 
both social and political conflict as well as violent conflict such as situations with casualties 
of death and injuries and several manifestations of insecurity as a result of access and 
control of resources (land, water and ocean) in the Global South.  
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The environmental subjects and identity thesis involves the emergence of social or political 
identities and movements in response to marginalization and degradation thesis. The 
environmental subject and identity thesis is the reverse image of the degradation and 
marginalization thesis, where exploitation leads to the simultaneous destruction of 
productive environmental resources and of local producers. It also happens when 
conservation and governance of nature draw together otherwise disparate communities and 
interests into collective action and so into collective awareness. Under this thesis, 
communities assert their identity through the way they make a living and vice versa and 
are able to develop and exercise the capacity to govern the environment by setting the terms 
of self-governance, ownership, and responsibility. 
 
Finally, the objects and actors’ thesis identifies both human and non-human actors in 
resources grabbing. The human actors include politicians, both foreign and domestic 
investors, peasants, small-scale fishers and other individuals who have stakes in land, water 
and ocean resources. The non-human resources include land, water and oceans together 
with all the resources that could be found in and/or around the resources, including, for 
example, fishery and mineral resources. 
 
 According to the thesis, non-human resources and humans’ interaction and the quest of 
control over such resources have made resource management a political activity.  
Politicians, bureaucrats, and private firms, therefore, assume new roles since they are also 
transformed by these interactions between resources and humans. These transformations 
have resulted in a certain level of power and influence to control the access to and use of 
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non-human objects (resources, including land, water and ocean) with unintended 
consequences and the pernicious effects of resource grabbing. In the process, resistance 
emerges from traditional, local or transnational alliances against marginalization and 
exploitation. The result is sometimes a rampant manifestation of violence and 
environmental insecurities associated with resource grabbing.  
 
The political objects and actors’ thesis identifies the interactions among the various 
individuals and institutions that result in resource grabbing. These interactions involve 
different levels of power and influence among bureaucrats, politicians and managers of 
natural resources in controlling such resources, as well as other non-state and non-human 
actors and agents.  
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Figure 6.2: Political Ecology and Resource Grabbing 
 
             
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                      Interactions                       
                                               Resulting Effect 
Source: Author’s Construct, 2016 
The first, second and third theses help explain what defines the nature of resource grabbing. 
The control thesis changes access, ownership and use of resources away from the prior 
resources users (with ethnicity, class and gender dimensions). Such control dispossesses 
these resource holders from their means of procuring livelihoods with adverse effects on 
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income and food security, resulting in abject poverty and loss of human rights. The effects 
of such controls are manifested by the first and third theses. The process whereby new 
actors gain control of natural resources from their prior owners and users marginalizes their 
own resources and they are often faced with the possibilities of being left with 
unsustainable communities with respect to their main sources of livelihoods.   
 
Aside from resource holders being marginalized and having their means of livelihoods 
degraded, the rise of such holders in defense of their resource has been characterized by 
social and political conflict, as well as armed conflicts, violence, and insecurities. Such has 
been a feature of resource grabbing where conflicts associated with grabbing have resulted 
in causalities relating to serious injuries and sometimes death over what has been described 
as the environmental conflict and exclusion in political ecology. The fourth thesis tends to 
focus on management of environmental problems associated with resource grabbing where 
social and political identities and objects emerge to fight against the common enemy of 
resource grabbing. This is often associated with collective actions aimed at developing and 
exercising the capacities to govern the environment by setting the terms of self-governance, 
rights, ownership, and responsibility. 
 
6.5 Policies for Resource Grabbing 
 
There is either no, insufficient or unclear domestic law concerning land rights, water rights, 
and pollution controls for natural resources in many developing countries of the Global 
South (Smaller and Mann, 2009). An integrated and holistic approach towards the 
governance of natural resources is lacking in most developing countries (Franco et al., 
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2013). Quite apart from that is the existence of international law frameworks, which, on 
the other hand, provide hard rights for foreign investors resulting in a layering of 
international laws and policies over domestic laws (Smaller and Mann, 2009). Therefore, 
economic rights of investors are protected in international treaties such as the World Trade 
Organization, while the social and cultural rights of marginalized groups are weakly 
protected or not protected at all.    
 
This section reflects on the policies relating to land, water and ocean protection. There 
have, to be sure, numerous laws and policies in developing countries formulated to protect 
the exploitation of natural resources. Overall, however, existing frameworks and 
weaknesses in institutions hinder a successful fight against resource grabbing. It must be 
noted that there are several policy recommendations that support a fight against land, water 
and ocean grabbing and the purpose of this section is to look at the policy areas which 
could be upheld and strengthened towards stopping resource grabbing in the Global South. 
 
On the issue of land grabbing, many governance instruments tend to neglect addressing the 
underlying economic and political drivers of land dispossession. The focus of many of 
these international policy responses to land grabbing is on land deals themselves, that is, 
their features and the procedural standards that should be observed during their negotiation 
(CFS, 2012; De Schutter, 2009; World Bank et al., 2010).  However, land grabbing is a 
complex phenomenon that cuts across both domestic and international dimensions. This 
means that there is no single policy that is capable of providing solutions to the 
complexities involved in land grabbing (Künnemann and Suárez, 2013). 
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The predominant global policy response to land acquisition has been framed by the World 
Bank’s report in 2010, which gave rise to a set of global consultations in 2010 and 2011 
on the principles for responsible agricultural investment (RAI). In 2012, the FAO 
announced that 100 countries and civil society representatives had completed negotiations 
on its Voluntary Guidelines (VG) for the responsible governance of tenure of land, fisheries 
and forests in the context of national food security, which it argued was consistent with 
both the Millennium Development Goals (now replaced by the Global Goals) and 
international human rights obligations (FAO, 2012; World Bank, 2010). In an attempt to 
achieve possible win–win scenarios, while giving a due recognition that large-scale private 
investment has a potential to generate “monopolistic abuse” (World Bank 2010), the FAO 
proposed that responsible agriculture investment should be governed by a set of seven 
principles. The seven principles proposed by the FAO to guide land acquisition include: 
 Respecting local land and resource rights; 
 Ensuring and strengthening food security; 
 Ensuring transparency, good governance, and an enabling environment; 
 Consulting those involved and enforcing agreements; 
 Respecting the law, following best practice and being economically viable; 
 Ensuring social sustainability; and 
 Minimizing and mitigating any negative environmental impacts (World Bank, 
2011). 
 
The growing concerns of water grabbing, just like that of land, have also triggered 
numerous and competing responses from the global community. However, there are three 
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setbacks as far as the framework for global responses to water grabbing is concerned 
(Franco et al., 2013). The first issue has to do with lack of an integrated and holistic 
institutional approach towards the governance of natural resources, which was also 
identified as a major challenge to the policies of land grabbing. For instance, most global 
policy responses to land grabbing tend to neglect water grabbing, even though the two 
issues are interconnected as described earlier. Water governance is still often done on a 
local or regional scale despite the global nature of water grabbing. The processes put in 
place to manage and control, access, use, and distribution of water are therefore 
fragmented, lack global coherence and offer a limited concrete solution to addressing water 
grabbing. 
 
Secondly, the current global bodies that shape the debates, processes and policies of water 
governance regime using Integrated Water Resources Management (IWRM) approaches 
are under increasing corporate pressure and have largely promoted a pro-water 
privatization agenda, promulgating the concept of water as an economic good. These 
bodies include the Commission on Dams (WCD), the International Commission on 
Irrigation and Drainage (ICID), the International Water Resources Associations (IWRA), 
the World Water Council (WWC), the Global Water Partnership (GWP), and the Global 
Water Operators’ Partnership Alliance (GWOPA). Such bodies are also supported by the 
multilateral institutions, including the World Bank, the IMF and other large donor 
organizations where development aid is sometimes linked to the privatization of water 
resources. The third reason for the limited institutional capacity to protect against water 
grabbing involves limited impacts by the frameworks intended to defend water as a human 
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right. The scope of most frameworks focus on the domestic use of water at the expenses of 
productive uses such as mining, agriculture, energy, hydropower and other capital-
intensive activities that are amongst the key drivers of water grabbing. 
 
In terms of ocean grabbing, quite apart from the lack of a coherent and holistic global 
natural resource policy, the blame also lies mainly with “license and access agreements” 
by which countries allow long-distance large-scale and industrial trawlers to scoop up fish 
from regions of the Global South. Many of these agreements are granted by weak 
governments and even lack proper enforcement in terms of what has been stipulated in the 
agreements.  Many of these agreements fail to scrutinize illegal or unreported catch, turn a 
blind eye to labour exploitation, abuse the fishery's sustainability limits and ignore the 
interests of and facilitate the marginalization of small-scale local fishers (UN, 2012). For 
instance, FAO guidelines support responsible fisheries and sustainable social and 
economic development for the benefit of current and future generations, with an emphasis 
on small-scale fishers and fish workers and related activities. However, the guiding 
principles from this global institution are voluntary and not binding on countries (Kurien, 
2015). 
 
There are a lot of policy recommendations on effective natural resource governance aimed 
at tackling resource grabbing. It would be unwise to rely on a single policy to deal with 
land, water and ocean grabbing. What is needed is a holistic and integrated approach that 
cuts across both domestic and international agendas in protecting small-scale natural 
resource holders. One such, and arguably most important, approach that has been noted is 
the consideration of land, water and ocean as a matter of a human right for their holders 
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and users. The United Nations’ 17 Sustainable Development Goals are focused on ending 
poverty, fight inequality and injustice, and tackle climate change by 2030. The targets of 
these goals are bound to ensuring and enhancing the rights and well-beings of humankind 
globally and are connected with the environment with goals six (Clean Water and 
Sanitation), 14 (Life below Water) and 15 (Life on land). These are directly related to 
protection against resource grabbing. This thus clearly shows how land, water and ocean 
are very important in achieving the basic rights of mankind and why the issue of human 
rights will be an important approach to solving resource grabbing. 
 
Land, water and ocean grabbing result in the destruction of the peasantry, small-scale 
fishers, pastoralists, and forest dwellers and their communities, which are the backbone of 
local food producing systems. This in turn deepens existing patterns of inequality, 
discrimination, and structural violence against women. The social fabric, stability, and 
peace of many rural societies are also at severe risk as are the rights and well-being of 
grabbees. This problem, therefore, calls for the need to fight resource grabbing on the 
ground of human rights and protection of well–beings of the poor, vulnerable and minority 
groups whose lives depend on the existence, access to, and use of natural resources. 
 
It is very remarkable to note that in the current global debate on land, water and ocean-
grabbing, the recognition of access to these resources as issues of human rights has gone 
uncontested and therefore widely accepted by various actors across the domestic and 
international divides (Franco et al., 2013; Künnemann and Suárez, 2013; UN, 2012). 
International human rights law, for instance, recognizes the human right to food by 
embedding access to land as part of the ‘right to feed oneself’. The FAO’s 2004 guidelines 
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also support the progressive realization of the right to adequate food through access to land 
(FAO, 2004). International human rights advocacy and practice have therefore taken a 
move to recognize that the enjoyment of various fundamental human rights, such as the 
right to food, the right to housing, the right to an adequate standard of living, the right to 
culture and the right to work, has an indispensable relationship with the right to land.  
Besides, rights to land ensures the right to self-determination and rural women’s rights (De 
Schutter, 2009; Gelbspan and Nagaraj, 2012; Kothari, 2007). Yet the problem of resource 
grabbing persists despite this wide recognition.  
 
There are some emerging notions about how to better integrate a human rights approach 
into addressing resource grabbing problems. For example, Künnemann and Suárez 
(2013:132) define the human right to land as “the right of every human being to access—
individually or as a community—local natural resources in order to feed themselves 
sustainably, to house themselves, and to live their culture”. They argue that applying the 
right to land as a human right provides a solid backing for the already significant grassroots 
mobilization of the numerous rural and urban groups to defend their lands or demand 
access to, and fair utilization of, land. They argue further that the human right in land has 
the potential to contribute to the empowerment of oppressed groups to stand up for their 
rights, decreasing violence in land conflicts, changing the way conflicts over resources are 
framed, opening up space for policy dialogue centered on people’s lives, and fighting 
against agrarian legislation biased in favor of corporate interests and formulating 
alternative legal frameworks. Künnemann and Suárez (2013), however, also admit that 
despite an increased awareness about the explicit relationship between land and several 
124 
 
human rights, a clear human rights approach specific to land issues has not been articulated 
under the existing international human rights framework. The current international human 
rights treaty framework only focuses on the right to land by indigenous groups. This 
implies that those outside that bracket are in a vulnerable position in terms of protecting 
their lands. They, therefore, argue that the time has come to establish the human right to 
land under international law, framework and in the practice of global governance. This 
progressive development in international human rights would be invaluable as a tool for 
global social justice and, in particular, to curb the global land grab. 
 
Others have proposed apply similar approaches to water grabbing. For example, Franco et 
al. (2013) believe that the emerging, state-of-the-art proposal for a “right to land” by 
advocacy groups provides a solid foundation for achieving the very objective of the right 
to water. According to Franco et al., human rights perspective on water remains vitally 
important in curbing water grabbing despite the shortfalls of the UN Right to Water 
approach to the issue. They regard the right to water as the best approach to ensuring access, 
use, and control of water resources against water grabbing. The human right to water and 
sanitation is a significant historical achievement and it is not surprising that it lies on the 
6th agenda of the Sustainable Development Goals (Global Goals). The main potential of 
rights is how it serves as a political tool to empower grassroots organizations to hold 
multinationals and States accountable in terms of water access, allocation, and uses. The 
right to water approach also serves an advocacy tool for resolving conflicts between the 
community and commercial water by prioritizing people’s needs over commercial 
interests. 
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Moreover, the challenge is to institutionalize the idea of human rights to water beyond 
voluntary guidelines and pronouncements into hard policy and legal frameworks. Franco 
et al. call for steps to push for legal interpretations and development on rights to water that 
strengthens dimensions such as the productive uses of water for people’s livelihoods in 
agriculture, fishing, livestock keeping and forest-based livelihoods as well as aligning it 
with the principle/right of people’s self-determination. The right to water has provided the 
basis for indigenous groups to use the legal means and global frameworks available them 
to protect their land and water resources. South Africa, Ecuador, Bolivia, Gambia, 
Tanzania, Uruguay, and others countries have recognized the human right to water, thereby 
committing to respect, protect and fulfill the right of access to safe and affordable domestic 
water services (Franco et al. 2013). This combination of legal frameworks, social 
mobilization, and advocacy can be a powerful tool and a driving force for establishing an 
alternative framework for water governance towards curbing water grabbing. 
 
On the issue of ocean grabbing, the FAO Voluntary Guidelines on the Responsible 
Governance of Tenure of Land, Fisheries and Forests brought about the Tenure and 
Fisheries Guidelines. These are the first international instruments dedicated to promoting 
and protecting the special needs and interests of small-scale fisheries and applying a human 
rights-based approach to the governance of oceans and fisheries. These Guidelines came 
about in June 2014, after member states of the FAO’s Committee on Fisheries (COFI) 
adopted the Voluntary Guidelines for Securing Sustainable Small-Scale Fisheries in the 
Context of Food Security and Poverty Alleviation (Franco et al., 2014, 2013). The Fisheries 
Guidelines also engaged the platform of civil society groups, including the World Forum 
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of Fisher Peoples (WFFP), the World Forum of Fish Harvesters and Fish Workers (WFF), 
the International Collective in Support of Fisher Workers (ICSF) and the International 
Planning Committee for Food Sovereignty (IPC). 
 
The Guidelines serve as a useful mechanism for deciding the rightful ownership of, and 
access to, fishery resources, for what purposes and who ought to decide from a pro-poor 
perspective when dealing with fisheries governance. This new institutional framework 
intends to protect the interests and rights of small-scale fishers; hence a useful institutional 
tool for fighting ocean grabbing. The Guidelines offer a useful tool for facilitating 
knowledge and information about fishery governance. Access to this knowledge and 
information is very useful for empowering fishery movements and fishers to tackle issues 
that affect their operations. It also provides a basis for nation state to incorporate the 
principles and framework within domestic policy frameworks.  
 
A human rights based approach is therefore very useful in addressing the problem of 
resources grabbing. The approach cuts across land, water and ocean grabbing, which helps 
to resolve the complexities involved in developing policies aimed at curbing the three 
phenomena of resource grabbing. The emergence of a human right approach to solving 
land grabbing could be used as a major tool for promoting the already existing right to 
water and right to ocean resources. This emergence of the right to land is based on the 
premise that the land is indispensable to the enjoyment of the right to food. This brought 
about the Tenure Guidelines that stress the importance of equitable and secure access and 
control over land and natural resources as a prerequisite for the right to food by vulnerable 
and marginalized groups (McKeon, 2013; McMichael, 2013). 
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The right to land approach provides a complex and normative framework for curbing water 
and ocean grabbing. For example, the right to food requires the resources of individuals, 
particularly the poor and the vulnerable, to be protected. Most rural residents and peasant 
landholders depend mainly on their lands for food production not only to feed themselves 
but for others who do not engage in mainstream food production or food markets. Water is 
essential both for agricultural food production and for its consumption as a source for 
human life. Likewise, small-fishers also require access to ocean fisheries, which serve as 
major food source for individuals to feed themselves across the Global South.  
 
The human right to land contributes to challenging this increasing inclination by states, 
IFIs and investors to treat land and related natural resources as commodities ruled by 
distant market signals and to concentrate the control of vital resources in the hands of a 
few. States must thus ensure policy environments that allow people to make sustainable 
use of land, water and ocean to feed themselves and to decide in a self-determined way 
how to develop their natural resources taking into account the right to these resources by 
future generations. In this sense, the sustainable use of natural resources, and conservation 
of such resources and biodiversity, are also important components of the right to these 
natural resources. 
 
To ensure an effective human rights approach to resource grabbing policy is a matter of 
domestic laws. International laws generally do not give foreign investors rights to invest in 
land, water and ocean in another state. Foreigners are able to secure access to these natural 
resources through the assistance of domestic laws unless there is an international 
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commitment made by a particular state. This means that international laws and policies that 
respond to access to natural resources as an issue of human right should use the bottom-up 
approach. The human rights approach is meant to ensure that states respect the rights of 
individuals and groups to the resources that provide their means of livelihood, just like 
other basic rights.  
 
Per the Framework for Political Economy Analysis, active participation by the various 
actors is very important in formulating such policies. The participation process should be 
able to identify who the key players are in land, water and ocean grabbing, and their 
respective interests and ideas, and the sources of their capacities and power for defending 
or challenging the status quo. The participation process should actively include grabbees 
who are mostly affected by resource grabbing, civil society groups as well as agents of 
states. The purpose of the actors’/stakeholders’ identification and participation is to 
facilitate information and knowledge action concerning the resource patterns and their 
rights to such natural resources. This serves as an important tool to defend their resources 
against grabbers mainly on the basis of human rights. Besides, grabbees are able to practice 
self-monitoring and reporting on their resources even when such resources have been 
allocated. 
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Figure 6.3: Framework for Political Economy Analysis 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Modified from Hudson and Leftwich, 2014 
 
The Framework for Political Economy Analysis also suggests identification of structural 
variables in developing policies that affect natural resources. These include the 
concentration of such resources, that is, whether at the rural or urban setting, the poverty 
situation of resource users, cultural values of such resources, the contribution of such 
resources to the livelihood and local economy, and other structural variables that ensure 
interactions between such resources and their users.  
 
Strong institutions are necessary if any policy is going to work effectively. Institutions refer 
to the norms, political systems, legal frameworks, and bureaucratic frameworks mandated 
to protect and implemented specific laws and policies. A human rights approach to resource 
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grabbing policy should be backed by domestic laws, such as other human rights and all 
stakeholders of such laws should be well informed. Such institutional structures should not 
just keep stakeholders informed but also have the means to seek redress when they feel 
their rights to natural resources have been abused. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
7.1 Summary 
 
The thesis sought to provide a comparative analysis on the concept of resource grabbing 
for three key resources—land, water and the oceans. It did so through the theoretical and 
analytical frameworks of political ecology and political economy. The analysis on of land, 
water and ocean grabbing establishes that resource grabbing occurs within the interplay of 
stakeholders (actors), motives (interest), institutions and institutional frameworks and also 
has effects. 
 
The thesis categorized actors into grabbers and grabbees. The grabbers are those whose 
actions result in control of resources from their prior holders and users. These include 
domestic states, foreign states, investors/transnational corporations, and combinations of 
those actors. The grabbees, on the other hand, primarily involve prior resource holders and 
those users are normally at a disadvantage as far as resource grabbing is a concerned. These 
include peasants, small-scale fishers and indigenous groups, and rural settlers more 
generally.  The grabbers are driven by motives that are either based on the interests of 
individuals or organization interests of corporations, investors, and states. Individual 
interests include profits made by investors from land investment particularly for food and 
biofuel productions.  Instances of the organizational interests are usually framed as 
collective interests, including interests in meeting food production to meet global food 
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requirements, global demands on certain types of fish and biofuel production to supplement 
global energy requirements and a reduction in climate change. 
Some of the motives of grabbers (actors) are manifested through institutions and 
institutional and regulatory frameworks. These include the influence of both domestic and 
international laws and policies on land, water and ocean grabbing. There are some 
international laws and policies that protect grabbers while weaknesses on the part of most 
domestic laws and policies help facilitate resource grabbing. Resource grabbing therefore 
involves the influence of institutional and regulatory frameworks on the motives of actors 
(grabbers), whose actions put other actors (grabbees) in a deprived position. 
The effects of resource control by grabbers include the marginalization of grabbees and 
degradation of land, water and ocean resources. This has the potential of creating 
unsustainable environments on the part of grabbees with possible violence and 
environmental conflicts associated with resource grabbing. 
Since the idea of a human right to food and water has been given some recognition in the 
current literature, the thesis proposes that a rights-based approach should be used to fight 
resource grabbing. It also suggests that it is important that effective analysis is done on the 
various stakeholders (actors), motives (interests) and the interplay of institutional 
frameworks to enhance effective policy formulation and implementation towards curbing 
resource grabbing. 
7.2 Conclusion 
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The controversies and global debates associated with resource grabbing in the name of 
land, water and ocean grabbing is something that seems to have no end. This is because 
day in, day out, new issues relating to land, water and ocean grabbing emerge and, 
depending on the circumstances and factors that account for such issues, authors and 
researchers of different backgrounds will always often have divergent views in analyzing 
and reporting such issues. It is therefore not new that the issue of resource grabbing has 
generated debates in the literature relating to the actors, motives, institutions and the effects 
of its occurrence. 
 
The rate at which resource (land, water and ocean) grabbing emerges and its reported 
effects have caught the attention of some international media and policy agendas; hence 
much research interest and debates that surround the phenomenon have been rapidly 
growing in recent years, though the research on land grabbing is far more extensive than 
the research on water and ocean grabbing. This rush in research works on resource grabbing 
has had effects not only on how the issue is described and presented but some of the facts 
and figures of their occurrences from the places reported are problematic. For instance, the 
quality and reliability of international databases on land deals constitutes a significant issue 
for the global land debate but most of these figures found in the literature are marred by 
inconsistencies, inaccuracies, reporting biases and ‘killer facts’ and have no means of 
verifications. What most of these research works failed to establish, despite these global 
debates on resources grabbing, is a comparative analysis on land, water and ocean 
grabbing, particularly with the frameworks of political ecology and economy analysis. This 
comparative perspective is also a key to formulating policies aimed to protect grabbees 
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from the various negative effects of grabbing. The comparative analysis above reveals 
certain areas that could be targeted for policy formulation and implementation. This thesis, 
therefore, sought to focus not on the specific details of certain claims about the quantitative 
scope and nature of resource grabbing. Instead, it focused on advancing an analytical and 
comparative understanding of the phenomenon by applying political economy and political 
ecological frameworks to three areas of resource grabbing, with a view to using these 
insights to develop policy responses at global and local levels. 
 
Another important revelation in this research stems from a lack of an integrated and a 
holistic policy to deal with land, water and ocean grabbing. This is due in part to the 
complexities associated with the phenomena in terms of their occurrences. This research, 
however, could not provide a single solution for the policy gap but instead suggested a 
general human rights approach, which can be used as a driving force towards the 
development of a broader set of policies that can tackle and manage resource grabbing. 
 
Indeed, the objective of providing a comparative analysis on resource grabbing within the 
contexts of land, water and ocean grabbing has been achieved. In terms of policy 
formulation, the research did not necessarily suggest specific policy recommendations for 
each of the resources within the resource grabbing debates but, rather, suggested a human 
rights approach through which the issues of resource grabbing can be resolved. This is 
because policies involving land, water and ocean management are very complex and may 
require far more research to unravel the specifics. In view of that, a future research project 
in the area is proposed assess cases of land, water and ocean policies and their implications 
for resource grabbing in the Global South. Such a research project is proposed to identify 
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the contributions of land, water and ocean policies that tend to influence resource grabbing 
in selected countries in the Global South. This is expected to identify weaknesses within 
these policy frameworks and suggest ways to address such weaknesses with the ultimate 
aim of resolving the social and environmental problems of resource grabbing. 
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